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Introduction: History and Memory in Contemporary Chile 
 
The exhibit of Chilean history in Santiago’s Museo Histórico Nacional (National 
History Museum) abruptly ends with a pair of shattered eyeglasses inside an otherwise 
empty display case. The half-pair of eyeglasses, which belonged to Salvador Allende, 
Chile’s socialist president from 1970-73, were broken on September 11, 1973 when 
Augusto Pinochet and Chile’s armed forces violently overthrew Allende’s Unidad 
Popular government. Today, the blackened lens and twisted frames make up the only 
piece of material culture to represent the last thirty-five years of Chilean national history.  
  Representing a national history of the period between the coup of 1973 and 1990 
when Augusto Pinochet’s seventeen-year dictatorship finally came to a close looms large 
in present day Chile. In fact, writing a national history of Allende’s government and the 
brutal dictatorship that followed it has been such a fraught process that today, nearly 
twenty years after the country’s transition back to civilian rule, Chile has yet to reach 
consensus over its recent and not-so recent past – and thus the empty space which follows 
Allende’s glasses in the Museo Nacional. While Chile may never reach consensus about 
the meaning of Pinochet’s dictatorship, over time one historical narrative will most likely 
displace the others and become hegemonic.  
 Over the past eighteen years, historians, scholars, journalists, and other social 
actors—all with different political projects and historical interpretations—have struggled 
to engrave their particular narrative of Pinochet’s dictatorship as Chile’s official national 
history. This thesis examines the narrative construction of one of the parties to that 
dispute, the Chilean Right, as it built and revised its story of the past after Pinochet left 
Chile’s presidential palace. This project, moreover, explores the reconstruction of a 
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conservative historical narrative as it seeks to define Chile’s past in the present and for 
the future.  
****** 
Since the coup of 1973 that ousted the democratically-elected president, Salvador 
Allende, Chilean conservatives and supporters of Augusto Pinochet have constructed a 
narrative that has dominated public discourse by virtue of the military regime’s control 
over most means of communication as well as the political and institutional state. This 
narrative portrays Pinochet’s dictatorship as having saved the Chilean nation (patria) 
from Allende’s totalitarian Unidad Popular government. However, beginning in the latter 
half of Pinochet’s rule but gaining ground in the post-dictatorship period, this “salvation” 
narrative has been challenged by “counter memory” narratives, which seek to destabilize 
the Right’s dominant account and expose the human rights violations committed under 
Pinochet’s rule.  
 The past eighteen years of center-left government under the Concertación 
alliance have brought cascading historical disclosures that formally challenged the status 
of Pinochet and legally and seriously damaged the credibility of his regime. To be sure, 
as incriminating documentation has come to light and proponents of “‘counter-memory”’ 
narratives have, in turn, gained greater influence in the discourse of historical memory, 
the Right’s ability to impose its own narrative of the dictatorial period has waned. Yet 
since 1990, Chilean conservatives and Pinochet supporters, along with the media voices 
which reflect their viewpoints, have waged battles with other sectors of society to obtain 
cultural and historiographic hegemony over this contested past — how the history of the 
1970-1990 period will be written. To be clear, this is not solely about historical 
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“revisionism,” an essential component in the process of writing history, but also historical 
re-evaluation, which, according to Susan Crane, “affects not only what later generations 
think they know about the past, it also affects the historical actors themselves, when 
contemporary history is at stake.”1  
A close examination of the post-Pinochet period, defined here as 1990-2006, the 
years between the return to civilian government and Pinochet’s death, offers insights into 
the battles waged to write the history of this critical era in Chilean history. It represents a 
particularly rich, if fraught opportunity to analyze this historiographic process because 
the writers of most concern are not professional historians but “popular” sources in the 
media and public life; and the audience is not academics, but the Chilean population 
itself.  The battle to define (not just “interpret”) Chilean history as it unfolds in the 
contemporary era is a memory battle, in which those who personally experienced this 
past fight to inscribe their history for a future they will not see.  
For Chile’s Right, the period after 1990 has been a difficult time as more and 
more revelations have damaged Pinochet’s reputation. Consequently, Chile’s 
conservatives have used this time to attempt to shape even more forcefully their own 
interpretation of Chile’s national history, refashioning their master, “salvation” narrative 
and directly challenging the memory of the Chilean Left. As the reader will see, this has 
largely entailed redefining exactly what happened between the election of Salvador 
Allende in 1970 and Pinochet’s final departure from the presidential palace in 1990.  
****** 
                                                
1 Susan Crane, “Memory, Distortion, and History in the Museum,” History and Theory 
36:4 (December 1997), 60. 
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 History as a discipline recognizes that although we access the past through 
multiple sources—interviews and archives, among others – these sources don’t by 
themselves yield a meaning of the past. While multiple understandings of these archives 
surface, those interpretations, while hopefully remaining faithful to the sources, still 
constantly change because of circumstances in the present. Despite concerted efforts by 
some to “close” the past— to stabilize a single narrative —the production of history is a 
never-ending process, and historical revision—the historians’ task in the present – a 
standard practice. With this in mind, my project examines the way in which a 
Conservative narrative of the 1970-1990 period changed over the first fourteen years of 
restored civilian government even though it insisted on the “completed” nature of that 
history and resisted revisions to its own (previous) interpretations. In that way, this thesis 
illustrates not just the construction of a particular ideological view of the past in Chile, 
but the contested “production of history” as it takes place in the public sphere.2 
Although a great deal has been written about Chilean historical memory, the bulk 
of this scholarship in Chile has emerged from a progressive, Left community that has 
largely examined the memories of those who experienced suffering and loss as a result of 
Pinochet’s dictatorship. While these works are highly important and can help us approach 
restorative future politics, there are few studies of an evolving conservative narrative that 
explain the 1973 coup and Pinochet’s dictatorship.  
The Right in Chile is by no means monolithic or homogeneous; there is no one 
conservative narrative of this time period, even though most conservatives will agree on 
the basic notion that the Pinochet coup saved the country from disaster. Yet it remains to 
                                                
2 For more on the “production of history” see: David William Cohen, The Combing of 
History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 1.  
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be seen how those who supported Pinochet at the outset of his dictatorship have come to 
understand him now that he is no longer in power. Have the public disclosures of his 
human rights abuses which have lent legitimacy to the proliferation of counter memory 
narratives led the Right to view Pinochet’s dictatorship differently? If the Right’s 
historical vision has changed, how is this, then, reflected in the narrative it is constructing 
about the period of Pinochet’s dictatorship and beyond?  
While this project explores the production of a vernacular national history in 
Chile, it chooses for its focus the narrative construction of an exceedingly controversial 
and contested period in this history. First, because it examines the writing of a recent 
past, questions of memory, and the complicated nature of collective memory, become an 
indispensable part of its subject. When those who personally experienced the past which 
is being defined and revised are still alive, as is the case with Chile, the struggle to 
institutionalize a particular narrative becomes a highly contentious task. Still, since this 
thesis concerns only “popular” history, not the work of scholars, it will not consider the 
ways in which academic history can come into conflict with the weight of personal 
experience. 3 Second, as stated above, this thesis examines the recording of Chilean 
national history. Writing a singular narrative of a nation’s history, the synthesis of 
disparate views, is always a difficult task. Because this narrative seeks to influence how 
the nation views itself and simultaneously vies to become the only way to understand the 
past, further layers of complication and conflict are inevitable.  Within this context, issues 
of historical exclusion, perversion, and erasure become commonplace. Third, this project 
                                                
3 For an interesting discussion of this within the context of one contentious museum 
exhibit, see Edward Linenthal and Tom Engelhart, eds.,  History Wars: The Enola Gay 
and Other Battles for the American Past (New York: Metropolitan Books), 1996. 
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examines the history of a profoundly divisive and disruptive past, a past that is, it is fair 
to say, among the most disturbing in Chile’s national history. As studies of the Holocaust 
have suggested, it is easier to talk about the suffering one has received as opposed to the 
suffering one has caused.4  As the wounds of Pinochet’s dictatorship are deep and fresh, 
historical narratives of such atrocity and social conflict are all the more contentious, all 
the more so in that, as opposed to the Holocaust, Chilean society has not yet reached 
consensus as to whether those who inflicted the suffering are responsible for serious 
crimes or were doing “what needed to be done.”  
****** 
This thesis examines the construction of a popular conservative historical memory 
specifically though an analysis of Chile’s newspaper of record, El Mercurio.  As the 
country’s leading conservative outlet, one can safely say that El Mercurio is the voice—
vocero—of the Right in Chile. First founded in 1827 but later established in 1900 in 
Santiago by the very affluent Edwards family, El Mercurio has garnered a degree of 
power and influence in Chilean society unrivaled by any other media source.5  
Its location at the heart of conservative politics in Chile has also made El 
Mercurio into a site of memory (lieux de mémoire) in Chilean history.6 The archive of El 
Mercurio is a central site where the Right in Chile has located its memories and through 
                                                
4 See Edward Linenthal, Preserving Memory: The Struggle to Create America’s 
Holocaust Museum (New York: Viking, 1995). 
5 It must be noted that, as with the British press, for example, print media in Chile has 
long been associated with political orientations that shape their coverage of the news as 
well as the editorial pages. To be well informed, readers will consult a variety of 
newspapers, not just one. Presently, El Mercurio faces more competition than it ever did 
before, but not enough to destabilize its reputation as the newspaper of record.  
6 Pierre Nora, Rethinking France = Les Lieux De Mémoire (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2001). 
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which it will revise its narratives of the past. In short, El Mercurio is a vital source to 
study the Right’s (re)production of the meaning of the 1973-1990 period in Chilean 
history. 
While El Mercurio has been for nearly two hundred years the privileged media 
voice of the Right and a key player in the formation of Chilean conservative memory, one 
also studies El Mercurio because of the ways it has helped mold Chilean cultural and 
political identity. El Mercurio claims to be not just a shaper of public opinion, but the 
“representative” of Chilean society—the cultural agent that dictates the terms of what it 
means to be Chilean. That El Mercurio is not just the “voice” of the Right but also the 
self-proclaimed definer of chilenidad (Chilean nationality) necessitates an examination of 
the crafting of its post-dictatorship historical narrative.  
Many studies have been published that examine El Mercurio’s ideology and its 
critical role in both the overthrow of Allende and during the course of Pinochet’s 
regime.7 But there is little scholarship regarding El Mercurio’s historical memory 
narrative, particularly since the return to civilian rule, that is, the different ways El 
Mercurio has represented and inserted Chile’s recent past of authoritarian rule into a 
larger narrative about Chile’s history. For El Mercurio, a newspaper that has, despite its 
conservative biases, maintained its reputation as a defender of democracy and democratic 
ideals, constructing a narrative of Pinochet’s dictatorship poses familiar and not-so 
familiar challenges.  
                                                
7 El Mercurio was a propaganda machine during Allende’s dictatorship and helped 
facilitate his overthrow. El Mercurio was also, for majority of Pinochet’s dictatorship, the 
only media outlet permitted to continue publishing.  
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Since the country’s independence, Chileans have come to emphasize their 
democratic tradition and continuity, particularly in relation to other Latin American 
countries. Major schools of Chilean historiography, at least since the mid-nineteenth 
century, have reinforced this narrative—what some would call a “whiggish” 
interpretation— and written history to reflect Chile’s imagined unending progress even 
during times of democratic rupture.8 It is fair to say that Chile has indeed enjoyed a more 
prolonged history of constitutional government than all of its neighbors. And the 
absorption of this view at a popular level, the “myth” that Chilean political stability since 
the 1830s was synonymous with an uncontested and continual growth of democracy, was 
not seriously challenged until the coup of 1973 and the dictatorship that followed.9 But 
by all standard measures, as confirmed by solid evidence, Pinochet’s seventeen-year rule 
was a repressive and authoritarian dictatorship. As such, his years in power represent a 
critical rupture of Chile’s political traditions that must call forth, at the very least, a 
reexamination, if not a revision, of that prior narrative.  
An analysis of the period between the coup of September 11, 1973 and the end of 
Pinochet’s dictatorship in 1990, then, can turn Chile’s longstanding historiography of 
democratic stability on its head. For those who supported this whiggish approach, and El 
Mercurio is certainly a representative of this within the popular sphere, the challenge in 
the post-dictatorship period is whether or how to revise its historical memory narrative in 
                                                
8 Among Chilean historians most noted for their conservative (positivist) approaches, one 
can site the work of Diego Barros Arana, Miguel Luís Amunátegui, and Domingo 
Amunátegui in the nineteenth century or Mario Góngora in the twentieth.  
9 Tomás Moulian’s influential book, Chile Actual: Anatomia de un mito, explores how 
the “myth” of Chilean democracy has unraveled since the end of Pinochet’s dictatorship. 
Tomás Moulian, Chile Actual: Anatomía De Un Mito (Santiago, Chile : ARCIS 
Universidad, LOM Ediciones, 1997).  
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the face of what was an irrefutably undemocratic period of Chilean history. My thesis 
explores this challenge, examining the discursive ways in which El Mercurio seeks to 
reinsert Pinochet’s dictatorship into a national narrative of democracy and progress. At 
the same time, as an extension of this work, my thesis raises questions about the 
responsibilities of the media as they seek to create a historical narrative. If a newspaper, 
which is a key ingredient of democratic society and ideals, can transform a period of 
authoritarian rule—of unjustifiable death and torture—into a period that strengthened 
democracy, then what is at stake for Chilean democracy in the present and future?  
****** 
 This thesis is organized into an introduction, three chapters, and a conclusion. In 
the first chapter, I explore some prevailing theories within the field of collective memory, 
and how these have been applied in the context of the Southern Cone and, ultimately, 
Chile. I also introduce the reader to the general contours of twentieth century Chilean 
history and trace the political context preceding Allende’s election and, three years later, 
Pinochet’s coup. I conclude chapter one by situating El Mercurio in its historical and 
journalistic context and explain why it has become an important site through which one 
can study how conservatives have viewed Chile’s recent history.  
 In chapter two, I examine more closely the 1973 coup and Pinochet’s dictatorship. 
Specifically I discuss the development of a new conservative politics and ideology as 
they unfolded after September 11, 1973 and evolved throughout Pinochet’s seventeen-
year rule. In this chapter I will also explore El Mercurio’s role both in reporting Chile’s 
“New Right” as well as in helping to bring it into creation. 
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 Finally in chapter three, I offer an empirical analysis of El Mercurio’s editorial 
and news writing between 1990-2006 and suggest whether and how Chile’s foremost 
conservative media outlet revised its historical narrative of the past. I explore five 
different time moments and locate the changing ways El Mercurio modified its vision of 
































Chapter One: Collective Memory, El Mercurio, and Twentieth Century Chilean History 
 
Each day, whenever El Mercurio hits Chile’s ubiquitous kiosks, the battle to write 
a national history of the past thirty-five years is fought out once again. El Mercurio’s 
unfolding narrative of Pinochet’s dictatorship does not fall within the confines of 
academic history as written by professional scholars. Rather it is history created in a 
popular mode—what some might call vernacular history—but it competes to define the 
meaning of Pinochet’s seventeen-year rule every bit as much as academic histories and, 
arguably, its chances of success are many times greater.  As with other groups struggling 
to engrave their historical narrative in the public domain, El Mercurio’s history, while it 
might incorporate documented evidence to verify “what happened” in the past, primarily 
appeals to the “historical consciousness” that is beyond text, deriving instead from 
collective experience and memory; its goal is not the generation of a “definitive” history, 
but rather to determine how what happened should be remembered.    
In this chapter, I explore the ways in which the writing of the history of 
Pinochet’s dictatorship within the public (popular) domain treads inexorably on the 
terrain of memory, and in particular, collective memory. To the extent that there is no 
established (consensual) national narrative of Pinochet’s regime, nothing to follow the 
display of Allende’s glasses in the Museo Nacional Histórico; to the extent that textbooks 
of Chilean history end with (or before) the coup of 1973; and to the extent that those who 
lived through this contested period are still present to debate its vastly different 
interpretations (Pinochet is variously described as a brutal dictator and a national 
liberator), the realm of collective memory becomes the battleground upon which a 
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popular struggle to define the past unfolds.  When one reads El Mercurio, one reads an 
historical account that seeks to shape not just how the Chilean public understands but also 
remembers its collective past, and how that past pertains to the present and future.  
El Mercurio’s national history narrative is what one historian, Steve Stern, calls a 
collective or emblematic memory narrative. Collective or emblematic memory narratives 
look broadly at a period of history and establish a coherent story that interprets the events 
of the past in a way that can resonate with the prior expectations of the general public. 
These narratives are not necessarily constructed by professional historians, but rather by 
social actors who work in the public domain to ensure that their version of the past 
becomes official history. While many understand memory as the experience of one 
individual, Stern and others maintain that emblematic or collective memories are formed 
by underlying social frameworks acting to influence how a group or society as a whole 
remembers its past. Indeed there is a level of mutual interaction in which one’s personal 
memories inform the collective memory and the underlying collective memory shapes the 
individual memory.  
Since the end of Pinochet’s brutal seventeen-year dictatorship, an increasing 
number of collective memory narratives have represented Pinochet’s regime as a period 
of intense “rupture, persecution, and awakening.”10 Stories (and histories) that had been 
repressed by the state or denied a public forum resurfaced after 1990 to challenge the 
dominant “salvation” history of the dictatorship. Yet the post-dictatorial period has not 
only seen narratives emerge from the (formerly silenced) Left. Conservatives also work 
                                                
10 See Steve J. Stern  Remembering Pinochet's Chile: On the Eve of London, 1998 
(Durham, N.C: Duke University Press, 2006).  This is the first of Stern’s trilogy of works 
on the topic.  
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to define the past, but their task and objectives are quite different. If the Left must give 
voice to its long buried stories, the Right must figure out how to shoe-horn a 17-year long 
dictatorship into a national narrative that has, for well more than a century, privileged the 
(imagined or real) liberal, democratic, constitutional traditions of Chile.   
As stated above, El Mercurio’s on-going construction of a post-Pinochet national 
history narrative was not written by professional historians and its audience was lay 
citizens not academics. This thesis, then, does not hold El Mercurio to “professional” 
standards of history production, nor does it question the paper’s engagement with 
historical revisionism, itself an essential component of historical work. What is of more 
concern and what this thesis seeks to examine is El Mercurio’s efforts to authorize its 
national history of Pinochet’s dictatorship.  
 Taking into account the ways in which El Mercurio’s historical narrative of the 
Pinochet dictatorship operates within the matrix of social memory, this chapter will 
briefly examine some of the burgeoning literature on collective memory. It will discuss 
how collective memory theory has been revised as it has been applied to Southern Cone, 
and more specifically, Chilean history in the latter part of the twentieth century. Because 
the memory story/ies of Chile presupposes a certain familiarity with the political and 
social background of the country, this chapter will also provide the reader with a brief 
overview of twentieth century Chilean history. Finally this chapter will introduce El 
Mercurio as key subject in the formation of conservative collective memory in Chile.  
Prevailing Theories of Collective, Historical, and Social Memory 
Much of the scholarship on historical memory comes from the work of French 
intellectuals who, starting in the aftermath of World War II, began to theorize the 
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relationship of history to memory by examining the “national memory” of France. It is 
important to note that this interest in historical memory occurred in the wake of France’s 
dismal military and rather unsteady political record in the 20th century. Recognizing that 
societies seek ways to commemorate and recover “what once was,” especially if, as in 
this case, “what once was” seemed more noble and glorious than the current era, these 
scholars tried to understand how and why the various means of remembering France’s 
national past—the physical places, images, and language—had changed over time. In 
other words, why did some collective memories of France endure the test of time while 
others faded into oblivion?  
The passage of time diminishes memory, both personal (as we well know), and 
collective. Those memories we once had of a certain event—be it an event we 
experienced personally or collectively as a nation—are therefore continually evolving. As 
we (individually, collectively) become distant from the date of the event itself, some 
memories remain and are subject to revision while others are simply forgotten, 
suggesting that they no longer hold much relevance in the present. These issues raise a 
number of questions, not the least of which are the ways in which societies remember the 
past, the way in which the present continually transforms the past, and the propensity of 
power to promote or suppress memories.11  
          In answering these questions, I am primarily drawing from the work of Maurice 
Halbwachs, Michel Foucault, and Pierre Nora.12 Any theoretical discussion of collective 
memory begins with the work of Maurice Halbwachs, certainly the scholar who opened 
                                                
11 See, for example, John Urry, “How Societies Remember the Past,” The Sociological 
Review (1996), 46. 
12 This synthesis borrows heavily from Patrick H. Hutton, History as an Art of Memory 
(Burlington, Vt.: University of Vermont, 1993). 
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the field to contemporary study. Halbwachs (1877- 1945), a sociologist by training, did 
much of his work on memory before the Second World War and was heavily influenced 
by France’s experiences during World War I. His findings, largely ignored while he was 
alive, reemerged in the late 1960s and the 1970s through the work of Michel Foucault, 
Phillippe Ariés, and Maurice Agulhon.13 
  Maurice Halbwachs’s theory of collective memory first emerged in Las Cadres 
Sociaux de la Mémoire (1925) where he presents three main arguments.14  First, 
Halbwachs argues that collective memory is a social construction; rather than an arbitrary 
grouping of personal memories, it is the deliberate (if unconscious) union of comparable 
individual memories. According to Halbwachs, individual memories over time coalesce 
into one idealized image of the past that constitutes a collective memory.15 The jump 
from individual to collective memory entails a process of selection. Those individual 
memories that cease to resonate over time within a certain group diminish and are 
eventually forgotten. Inasmuch as it is individuals who remember the past and not 
groups, Halbwachs claims that “there are as many collective memories as there are 
groups and institutions in society.”16 
  The coalescing of individual memories over time, however, relies on social 
groups to carry out the work of remembering, consciously or unconsciously. Herein lies 
Halbwachs’ second point, one that has since helped contemporary historians understand 
the complex relation between history and memory. Halbwachs claims that the power of 
                                                
13 Ibid.,73.  
14 Nearly twenty-five years later (and five years after his death), Halbwachs’ Le Mémoire 
Collective was published in English as The Collective Memory.  
15 Ibid.,7.  
16 Maurice Halbwachs, On Collective Memory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1992), 22.  
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collective memory resides in its ability to establish roots within social frameworks: a 
collective memory endures when it resonates with social groups that stake a claim to it. If 
we accept that memories change over time, then the power of collective memories must 
depend on social groups (and their relative access to power) to provide continued support 
for the “collective” memory that reinforces their view of the past.17 
  Similarly, although approached from a different perspective, individual memories 
are also immediately shaped by a larger, more collective memory. As Halbwachs argues, 
the way one remembers the past reflects the social group to which he/she belongs. In Las 
Cadres, Halbwachs specifies some of these social groups as the family, the Church, and 
most significantly socioeconomic class. 18 Two later memory scholars working in Latin 
America and Spain respectively, Elizabeth Jelin and Paloma Aguilar Fernández, have 
argued along similar lines. Jelin asserts that “individual memories are always socially 
framed,”19 while Aguilar suggests that “individuals are able to recall the past precisely 
because they belong to a social group. The interests and experiences of the group shape 
the memories of its members and the very fact that they belong to the group helps them to 
remember (by means of referral) and to recreate their own experiences collectively.”20 
Halbwachs elucidates the symbiotic relationship between collective and individual 
memories. He demonstrates that both kinds of memory subconsciously rely on social 
frameworks. Whereas individuals depend on social groups to inform their personal 
memories, collective memories rely on social frameworks to keep them alive. For 
                                                
17 Ibid, 21.  
18 Ibid..   
19 Elizabeth Jelin, State Repression and the Labors of Memory (Minneapolis, MN: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2003), 11.  
20 Paloma Aguilar Fernández, Memory and Amnesia: The Role of the Spanish Civil War 
in the Transition to Democracy (New York: Berghahn Books, 2002), 11. 
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Halbwachs, social amnesia can occur when these social frameworks dissolve or break 
apart. 
Halbwachs’s third main argument is that memory is constantly revised because of 
circumstances in the present. Halbwachs assumes a presentist perspective on collective 
and individual memory, arguing that when we look back, we do not conjure up the same 
past that we had originally perceived. Instead, our personal and collective reminiscences 
go through a filter that refashions our memories based on the present. In other words, 
memory is a reconstruction of the past from the vantage point of the present. In writing 
about Halbwachs, Patrick Hutton succinctly observes “remembering, therefore, might be 
characterized as a process of imaginative reconstruction, in which we integrate specific 
images formulated in the present into particular contexts identified with the past.”21 
  But how does Halbwachs explain the difference between history and memory? If 
memory is a social reconstruction of the past based on the present, what is the role of 
history and historians? In La Mémoire Collective, Halbwachs argues that history and 
memory are separate enterprises and retrieve two different pasts. Where memory is 
whimsical and mystical in its ability to bring the past back to life with emotions intact, 
history is more sterile and can only resurrect a past that has been stripped of its emotional 
resonances. Halbwachs maintains, however, that it is the historians’ job to “keep memory 
honest”22—history must fill in the gaps of the past that memory leaves behind. It can be 
said then that Halbwachs saw the amalgamation of “objective” history and “subjective” 
memory as the fundamental ingredients in the production of History. 
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  Although a revitalized appreciation for Maurice Halbwachs’ work came years 
after his death, several other French theorists have also contemplated memory within 
similar contours. French philosopher Michel Foucault has garnered praise for his 
contributions to the politics of memory. Although Foucault’s work focused more on the 
rhetoric of commemoration than on memory, his argument that historical discourse 
constantly evolves based on the present can easily be applied to the process of collective 
memory. As the way in which we discuss the past is reconfigured because of the present, 
so too is the way we represent the past, both in word and deed or commemoration, in our 
memories. Foucault maintained that what may appear to be the past retrieved by 
commemorative rhetoric is actually a representation of how society once “talked” about 
the past. In this way, Foucault’s theory of historical discourse is akin to Maurice 
Halbwachs’s argument of social frameworks and collective memory. For Foucault, the 
reconfiguration of historical discourse relies on powerful social groups to promulgate the 
myriad discursive representations of the past.23 
 Maurice Halbwachs and Michel Foucault centered their work on the internal 
mechanics of memory. Both argued that memories are representations of a past that we 
reconstruct based on the present. What Halbwachs and Foucault (and many others) first 
suggested has since been applied, among others, by Pierre Nora (1931-      ), a French 
historian and perhaps the most preeminent contemporary scholar in the field. In Nora’s 
most significant project, Les Lieux de Mémoire (1984-92),24 he and fifty other French 
historians set out to understand why the French Revolution had ceased to represent the 
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pinnacle of French political identity. This subject led Nora and his colleagues to question 
more broadly where and why other French sites of memory had evolved to take on new, 
more powerful meanings, thus eclipsing the Revolution. For Nora, imagining France’s 
future required discovering where and how France had previously been represented in the 
nation’s collective mentality. This meant passing through the “commemorative 
monuments, shrines, national histories, civic manuals and history textbooks, public 
archives and museums,”25 and concluding that the omnipresence of memory sites is a 
product of the obliteration of living memory.  
 Nora opens Les Lieux de Mémoire with the essay “Between Memory and 
History,” in which he lays out the conceptual framework that guided his project. He 
argues that “there are lieux de mémoire, sites of memory, because there are no longer 
milieux de mémoire, real environments of memory.”26 According to Nora, history has 
diminished and destroyed living memories because of a need to organize them into 
representations of the nation. Sites of memory, like monuments, museums, and textbooks, 
exist because history has colonized our whimsical, precious reminiscences of what is no 
longer. If it were not for the “conquest and eradication of memory by history,” there 
would not be the need to continually commemorate the past—the constant need to 
retrieve the irretrievable.27 Nora also argued, and this is critical for understanding the 
function of memory both within the Southern Cone and more specifically within the 
Chilean context, that the need to commemorate or catalog the past emerges during 
moments of historical disruption or dislocation.  As individuals, but more visibly, as 
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social groups, we “return to the past” during periods of rupture, when history changes 
course.   
Like Halbwachs, Nora assumes what some might see as a particularly cynical 
view of history. He argues that history is always the reconstruction of what once was, 
while memory is our eternal link to the past, present, and future. But Nora’s critique of 
history goes further. As he claims, “history’s goal and ambition is not to exalt but to 
annihilate what has in reality taken place.”28 Yet given his provocative stance towards 
history, Nora nevertheless acknowledges that the creation of lieux de mémoire makes 
historians out of everyone. Every group within society feels a need to recreate its identity 
by the reconstruction of its own history. So while it is history that destroys memory, it is 
historiography—or the representation of the past (what one might designate as History, 
with a capital “H”)—that in turn gives birth to sites of memory. The latter argument 
applies to El Mercurio as many would say that the paper is both representative and 
generative vis-à-vis memory. It is representative in that it reflects the way the Right in 
Chile has constructed and revised its understanding of the past. But it is also generative in 
the sense that El Mercurio itself has become a site that fashions a memory of the past.    
 For Halbwachs, Foucault, and Nora, moreover, the key concept towards 
understanding the connection between history and memory is representation. The archive 
of history resides not in actual events themselves (events which, in any case, we can only 
access through representation) but rather in the way these events have been represented 
and refashioned in our memories.  Pierre Nora observes those representations in lieux de 
mémoire whereas Michel Foucault focuses on the discursive practices that have 
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reconceived our traditions over time. Despite different methods, the unifying core of their 
work is a desire to understand where and how French identity has been represented in the 
past in order to understand how French national memory will be constructed in the 
present and future. Without doubt, contemplating why these three men theorized memory 
specifically in the context of twentieth century France would be a thesis in and of itself. 
But, building on the work of these French academics, the study of collective memory has 
become an important field of analysis in the Southern Cone of Latin America where 
countries such as Argentina, Brazil, and, Chile only recently emerged from long and 
brutal periods of political and civil conflict. 
Memory Studies in the Southern Cone and Chile 
The study and understanding of memory in the context of Latin America’s 
Southern Cone and Chile, specifically, is inextricably linked to the traumatic events of 
repression and government terrorism of recent times. The scholarship of memory, 
particularly collective memory, within the Southern Cone approaches memory largely 
from the specific vantage point of a post-traumatic political reality, and sees its work as 
intimately linked to rebuilding a truthful past and achieving justice for the victims.  
During but particularly after the violent period of state repression known as the 
“Dirty Wars” in South America, memory became a powerful and important means for 
those who experienced personal tragedy to deal with their loss and suffering.29 While 
“memory” has historically been one of the key ways politically marginalized or 
suppressed groups have attempted to influence public opinion and historical 
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consciousness, it became a particularly poignant outlet in countries like Argentina and 
Chile where state repression most often took the form of “disappearing” political 
opponents. The call to remember was a way of insisting both that the “disappeared” 
person did exist –bodies could disappear, but not memories—and to ensure that such 
atrocities “never happen again.”30 Groups of women in Chile and Argentina, in particular, 
used their own inscribed memory (via photographs, kerchiefs made from diapers, and 
other artifacts), and incorporated them literally on their own bodies, to keep the past 
alive.31  
Since the end of Pinochet’s dictatorship, the study of memory—particularly 
collective and historical memory—has surfaced with even greater force as Chile’s 
citizens both individually and collectively come to terms with a contentious and troubled 
past.  The historiography of memory in Chile is vast and includes the innovative work of 
Elizabeth Jelin, Elizabeth Lira, Brian Loveman, and Steve Stern, among others.32 Their 
work sheds light on why “memory” has become an arena of political struggle in Chile, 
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and suggests why El Mercurio, in particular, is a central actor in the battle to engrave 
Chile’s national history. 
One of the most important memory scholars writing about the experiences of 
nations in the Southern Cone is Elizabeth Jelin. In Los trabajos de la memoria (translated 
as State Repression and the Labors of Memory), Jelin emphasizes that the periods of 
government oppression in countries like Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil, and Chile present a 
whole new set of dimensions to the discussion of collective memory.33 What frames this 
debate is that memory retrieves the past so as not to forget it, whereas in other 
circumstances memory retrieves the past in order to relive or revive “what once was.” 
Further, in the Southern Cone, as in other places that recently emerged from conflict-
laden pasts, memory is connected to the political challenges of the present, namely the 
reinstitution of democratic government. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, memory 
studies in cases of trauma present new intricacies because many of the groups and 
individuals who experienced immense loss and suffering and many of those who inflicted 
it, are still alive, often times living side-by-side. Memory in this case is a living (daily) 
experience. In the context of Latin America’s Southern Cone, as Jelin keenly observes, 
“there was no generational renewal, and the conflicts of the past were still part of the 
‘lived experience’ of most actors.”34  
In State Repression and the Labors of Memory, Jelin explores several conceptual 
frameworks that I find particularly useful with regards to El Mercurio’s post-Pinochet 
historical narrative. In reference to Maurice Halbwachs’s “cadres” or social frameworks, 
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Jelin supports the claim that collective memory is a social construction; that memories 
are more reconstructions than they are recollections. The way we as individuals 
remember the past is a reflection of the social group to which we adhere. Jelin, however, 
stresses the differences between the memory reconstructions of social groups of privilege 
and those of dispossession or disadvantage. Because Jelin sees memory as a product of 
struggle, she also accentuates the role of individuals within Halbwachs’ theory of social 
frameworks in carrying out the “labors” of collective memory. As Jelin notes, 
“[collective memory] calls for placing primary attention on the processes of development 
and social construction of these memories.”35 Jelin insists that we bear in mind the 
agency and active participation of individuals in the formation of and struggle for 
collective memory. Similar to Halbwachs, Jelin argues that the way we reconstruct the 
past in our minds is connected to present political conflicts. But Jelin’s presentism is 
magnified by the political circumstances in the Southern Cone. As Jelin argues, for Latin 
American nations emerging from dictatorships, the struggle for memory, to not forget or 
become obstinate becomes linked to the struggle to reinsert democracy. For Jelin, part of 
retaining a constitutional form of government involves the remembrance of the past in the 
construction and acknowledgement of collective memory.  
Given these underlying postulations about memory, one of the most salient 
arguments in Jelin’s text is of the way in which struggles over the narrative of memory 
occur. As “memory expresses itself in a narrative story which can be conveyed to 
others,”36 Jelin suggests that different groups struggle in the public sphere so that their 
memory narrative of the past becomes the truthful one, displaces the non-truthful one, 




and asserts its hegemony. In the context of the Southern Cone, memory struggles often 
pit the narratives of those who have personally experienced repression against those who 
see the establishment of authoritarian regimes as a salvation. As Jelin points out, there is 
a need for those who have undergone loss and suffering at the hands of the state to 
counteract the state’s “official history” by achieving hegemony over the past. This 
argument directly relates to the work of El Mercurio in this period as it struggles in the 
public domain to make its version of Pinochet’s dictatorship the “official” version—
Chile’s national history.  
Jelin further argues that the root of a “hegemonic” narrative of the past resides in 
the notion of a “master” narrative that stems back to the nineteenth century in Latin 
America. These master narratives, according to Jelin, “serve[d] as a central node for 
identification and for anchoring national identity.”37 In this way, what will be the 
“official history” or “hegemonic narrative” of the dictatorial regimes in the Southern 
Cone carries a lot of weight not just for how the past is remembered but also how post-
dictatorial national identities are constructed. Jelin reminds us that “the master national 
narrative tends to be the story of the victors” and so the “memory” struggle surrounds the 
ability of counter memory narratives to replace the state’s “salvation” narrative as the 
official history.38 This point is again critical as the reader contemplates the power of El 
Mercurio’s memory narrative to define Chilean post-dictatorial national identity and to 
perpetuate the nation’s master narrative of unending democratic stability.   
As a final note, Jelin offers some helpful reflections on the connection between 
memory and history. While she argues that there is “no one way to articulate the 
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relationship between memory and history,” she nevertheless suggests that history and 
memory bear a mutual relationship. 39  As she says, “memory is a crucial source of 
history” while history enables us to question and challenge memory.40  In the context of 
the Southern Cone, memory struggles frequently occur around the representation of 
conflict-laden pasts, pasts that are typically connected by a specific type of agency 
expressed through human rights movements. Because of that, “the historian or social 
scientist may under certain conditions become a public actor, and his or her positions vis-
à-vis a particular conflict may have political consequences that extend beyond 
disciplinary knowledge and academic debate.”41 
Where Jelin makes broader statements about the collective memory of repression 
in the Southern Cone, historian Steven Stern narrows in on the specific case of collective 
memory in Chile. While Stern employs similar arguments for the salience of memory in 
the Southern Cone, he notes that in Chile, the memory question is particularly significant 
because of the social impasse seen in the country since the transition back to democratic 
rule (a history capped off, as I suggested, by Allende’s shattered eyeglasses). For Chile, 
the dichotomy of memory vs. oblivion fails to accurately encompass the myriad ways that 
memory reaches the hearts and minds of Chileans. The memory struggles of Chile are, as 
Stern claims, the struggles of those who “are seeking to define that which is truthful and 
meaningful about a collective trauma,” not simply the struggle to remember so as not to 
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forget.42 Stern argues that the paradigm of “memory against forgetting” should be revised 
to reflect a struggle of memory against what he calls “obstinate” memory.  
Although he works within the vein of collective memory, Stern’s theory of 
emblematic memory, as set out in the first two volumes of his projected trilogy, The 
Memory Box of Pinochet’s Chile, distinguishes his work from previous scholarship in the 
field. Emblematic memory, as Stern defines it, is a socially constructed framework that 
organizes personal memories of the past into a collective narrative as it simultaneously 
imparts interpretative meaning to the past. For Stern, emblematic memory differs from 
collective memory in that it isn’t just the fusion of similar experiences and memories into 
a larger narrative but rather the acknowledgement by a social group of the essential truth 
of that narrative. In other words “a framework of remembrance is emblematic because 
many people have come to share the idea that it represents truth.”43  
In Remembering Pinochet’s Chile on the Eve of London 1998, Stern identifies 
four emblematic memories that he suggests have developed in Chile since the coup: 
salvation, rupture, persecution and awakening, and the closed box. These particular 
memory fields are not naturalized, i.e., they are not triggered by memories themselves, 
but rather they represent the collective agency of portavoces (or as Jelin would call, 
memory entrepreneurs) who struggle to keep their “truths” of the past in Chile’s public 
imagination.  
Like Jelin, Stern highlights the agency of individuals in social groups who 
perform the labors of emblematic memory making. Stern labels concrete criteria for the 
creation of emblematic memories, suggesting that tangible work is done and specific 
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conditions—moments of rupture or conflict—are required to elevate “loose memories” to 
the emblematic. In other words, moments of conflict provide the catalyst for social 
groups to organize personal lore (personal experiences or memories) into an emblematic 
narrative that reflects a collective truth. As Stern notes, “when the symbols and 
consequences of a rupture are widely experienced by adults and youth as a ‘defining issue 
or moment,’ the necessity to elaborate collective memory and meaning becomes more 
powerful.”44 In Chile, one moment of rupture, the bombing of the Presidential Palace (La 
Moneda), on September 11, 1973, has come to represent for some the annihilation of 
Chile’s long-standing democracy (and with it the loss of a family member or close 
friend), while for others, it is remembered as the truthful representation of Chile’s 
salvation from Marxist subversion and civil war.   
While Stern explores the emblematic memories of salvation and that of the 
“closed box” that typically align themselves with supporters or sympathizers of 
Pinochet’s regime, the bulk of his work regards counter-emblematic memory narratives, 
those of rupture, persecution and awakening.45 Indeed this focus is not surprising or 
unfounded given its connection to active, international human rights movements. The 
question of conservative memory narratives in Chile, as previously mentioned, however, 
remains virtually unexplored. As Stern and others demonstrate, the predominant 
conservative narrative represents Pinochet’s government as having saved Chile from a 
“Marxist Cancer,” while putting the country on the path of successful capitalist growth. 
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But little research has been done to suggest whether this historical narrative has changed 
over the period since Pinochet left the Moneda, a period of democratic government and 
accumulating historical documentation on the dictator’s methods. To explore this 
question, I examine one of the “memory entrepreneurs” active in the field of conservative 
ideological production, El Mercurio. In the next section, I locate El Mercurio within a 
broader historical context, highlighting the social and political circumstances that helped 
lead to the democratic rupture on September 11, 1973.  
Twentieth Century Chilean History:  
 Chile’s twentieth century was marked by intense economic fluctuations, social 
transformations, and the expansion of democratic participation in the electoral and, more 
broadly speaking, political process. For Chile’s Right, however, the decades leading to 
the election of Salvador Allende in 1970 witnessed a continuation of traditional and 
uninspired leadership. Despite an unprecedented increase of popular inclusion in politics 
over the course of the twentieth century, the Right demonstrated a wooden determination 
not to broaden its base of support outside of Chile’s powerful elites and the campesinos 
(peasants) controlled by landlords in the countryside. In fact, it was not until the 1964 
election of Christian Democrat Eduardo Frei Montalva, signaling the birth of a party 
which could challenge conservatives from the center, that Chile’s traditional Right would 
finally act to refashion its image and organize itself around a consolidated ideology 
which was both anti-democratic, and anti-participatory even as they continued to contend 
in the traditional electoral arena. By the time Salvador Allende stepped into office, a new 
conservative force had officially arrived and was awaiting the right moment to reclaim 
power from the Left and mount an authoritarian regime. 
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 Since the 1830s Chile’s government had operated within a fairly conventional 
two-party structure (Conservatives and Liberals). From the outset, this set-up was notable  
for its ability to channel the fight over resources into predictable (constitutional) outlets, 
and because it allowed the country’s elites to exercise control over both parties. This 
pattern, which became known as an acuerdo de caballeros (gentlemen’s agreement), 
lessened political violence even as it marginalized the nascent social forces of the 
twentieth century. Yet even the new parties on the Left that developed after the turn of 
the century, the Communists and Socialists, parties which located their political base 
within the newly emerging urban working class, remained within older political alliances 
led by middle-class parties (Radicals). Conservative parties, as I have said, relied on a 
loyal and consistent electorate within the country’s rural aristocracy and the peasants they 
controlled, and among economic elites in the cities.  
       The ideology of this “Old Right” was characterized by the pursuit of its dominant 
class interests rather than developing a political approach that would allow it to expand 
its base of support.  It more often sought strategic holds at the parliamentary rather than 
presidential level and sought non-elite votes by using its economic clout in the cities and 
tradition and intimidation in the rural areas. The Right thus stayed in power for most of 
the nineteenth century by a clever combination of social inclusion, usually through 
targeted marriages of important up-and-coming mining, and then industrial elites, or by 
buying or bullying other electoral supporters.46 Yet by the turn of the century and the 
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crushing blows dealt to Chile by both World War I and the U.S. stock market crash, it 
was anything but fortuitous that Chile’s emerging social groups grew gradually 
disillusioned with the Right’s elitism.47 
The Build-Up to a Rightist Re-Orientation  
The road to Allende’s 1970 election, and the birth of a “New Right,” arguably 
began with the 1932 re-election of the patrician Arturo Alessandri, who had already 
served one, shortened term as president from 1920-24. Alessandri became one of Chile’s 
dominant elite families (his son would serve as president from 1958-64 and would 
narrowly lose to Allende in 1970), largely because he recognized that Chile’s ruling class 
needed to modernize its political base beyond the tactics of repression in order to gain 
electoral control. His election in 1932 ushered in what came to be called the Compromise 
State (estado de compromiso) which accepted the interventionist role the state would 
have to play in the provision of social welfare and in the regulation of labor relations if 
capitalism itself was to be stabilized in the midst of a world depression. The Compromise 
State saw a renewed sense of “political bargaining between parties, a process of 
industrialization, a slow but progressive consolidation of political democracy, increased 
state involvement in the economy, and the establishment of a relatively open system of 
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negotiation between organized workers and the entrepreneurial sector.”48 In many ways, 
it marked the first moment in which Chile’s Old Right recognized the need to respond 
and act according to the country’s political development—although the tradition of 
buying or coercing votes, particularly in rural districts, didn’t actually cease until after the 
1950s. 
Still, the Right’s ability to adjust to a growing electorate and thus a changing 
political atmosphere only went so far. As Simon Collier and William Sater note, “the 
parties maintained (albeit within a broadening framework) much of the character that had 
been theirs in Parliamentary times.”49 Thus, while the social conditions demanded 
legislative reform, the conservative leadership that could have—and should have—helped 
enact that change, remained aloof and primarily unresponsive. As I have suggested, it 
was not until the watershed election of 1964 and the emergence of the Christian 
Democrat Party to the forefront of national politics that the Right in Chile began to shift 
its ideology and seek votes in new territory based on political competition, and not just 
traditionally coercive methods.  
The years following Arturo Alessandri’s second presidency up to the election of 
his son, Jorge Alessandri in 1958 was one of competitive party politics and coalition 
building. If one characteristic of the years between 1938-52 was an increase in the power 
of Left-leaning parties, particularly the Socialists and Communists, who became regular 
participants in “Popular Front” style coalitions that were led by the centrist Radical Party, 
the other was the Right’s continued inability to appeal to those outside of its 
                                                
48 Marcelo Pollack, The New Right in Chile, 1973-1997 (Houndmills, Basingstoke, 
Hampshire: MacMillan Press, 1999), 25.  
49 Collier, A History of Chile, 1808-2002, 237.  
 37 
socioeconomic cohort or to find new leadership. The glory days of Chile’s elitist parties 
(Conservative and Liberal) had passed as they showed “a continuing electoral decline in 
the face of advancing centrist and leftist political groups.”50  Indeed, the Right’s two elite 
parties would soon merge into one.  
In the 1958 elections, the Right sought a tried-and-true candidate, settling, once 
again, on Jorge Alessandri. They faced their most serious threat to date from a Left-center 
coalition, the Frente de Acción Popular (FRAP) led by a stalwart of the Socialist Party, 
Salvador Allende, who had occupied the cabinet post of health minister in an earlier 
coalition government. But a new centrist party, the Christian Democrat Party (PDC-
Patrido Demócrata Cristiano), would also diminish their vote, particularly in rural areas.  
The Christian Democrats had a mixed heritage, a product of Chile’s Falangist Party (a 
derivative of Franco’s party in Spain) and reform-minded social Christians. The PDC 
would come to challenge the Left for votes among urban workers and the nation’s lower 
classes, and the Right among the peasantry. Alessandri won the election by a razor-thin 
margin (33,000 votes out of 1.2 million cast), but the election results suggested that the 
“Hijo del Leon” (Lion’s Son) could not bail out the Right by using privilege and a 
historic sense of entitlement to continue to win elections.51 The election of 1958 also, and 
perhaps most importantly, marked the beginning of a political trend in Chile that would 
continue until the coup of 1973: the emergence of a political order characterized by a 
state divided into three political factions (right, center, and left), each able to command 
similar numbers of voters.  
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Alessandri’s economic agenda did not succeed in mitigating the country’s stark 
socioeconomic disparities nor in addressing the high rates of inflation that began to 
plague it. But his years in office did see an enormous increase in size of the working and 
middle class electorate, which tended to strengthen the Christian Democrats and the Left 
at the expense of the traditional Right parties.52 In the 1964 elections, the Right wouldn’t 
even run a candidate, pressured by the U.S. Embassy to back the Christian Democratic 
candidate, Eduardo Frei Montalva, for fear that the Socialist Allende, running for a third 
time, would use a three-way split to his advantage.  
The 1964 election was a watershed in Chile’s recent history. Magnified by the 
Cuban Revolution of 1959 and a widespread turn in Latin America towards socialism as a 
viable alternative, the election’s stakes were high and the campaign reverberated all over 
Latin America. Within Chile, the newly mobilized middle and working classes voiced 
increasing demands for social reform—particularly in the agrarian realm—and a state-
driven, nationalist economic policy. Allende ran on a platform of vast political 
transformation in order to put Chile on the path to socialism while Frei promoted 
constitutional reforms without undermining “traditional freedoms.”53Although Allende 
did better than in the previous two elections, gaining 39 percent of the votes, Eduardo 
Frei won with a sweeping 55 percent. One of the more valuable lessons for the Right that 
it could have derived from the election was that its best electoral chances would arise 
from a coalition with the center. It was a lesson the Right ignored in 1970.  
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To the extent that Frei’s center-reformist government increased the role of the 
state in both the economy and social welfare programs at the same time that it threatened 
conservative control of the rural areas through its agrarian reform legislation, the Right 
became daily more alienated from Frei and the PDC.54 In 1966, in an attempt to halt their 
slide, the Right’s two parties, Partido  Liberal and Partido Conservador coalesced to 
form the Partido Nacional (PN). As the key to the Right’s electoral success had long 
been its iron-fisted control of the rural electorate, a control which was steadily eroded by 
the PDC’s agrarian reform program, it realized that it would have to find a new 
theoretical grounding, a central project, on which it could appeal to voters outside of its 
elite circles. In this regard, the new party began to gravitate to one of its earliest heroes, 
Diego Portales and what became known as “Portalian” politics. Portales, who never 
served as Chile’s President, exercised virtually dictatorial powers from his various 
cabinet positions in the early 1830’s. Conservatives credit him with quelling the post-
independence anarchy in Chile, which he accomplished by brutal methods. He believed 
in authoritarian rule until the time that Chileans might be “ready” for democracy.55 
Having developed a considerable distrust of political parties and democratic governance, 
the Partido Nacional began to call for a return to more authoritarian systems, suggesting, 
as Portales did, that Chile was not yet ready for democracy. Marcelo Pollack pointedly 
                                                
54 On the Christian Democratic Party in power, see Michael Fleet, The Rise and Fall of 
Chilean Christian Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985); Ricardo A. 
Yoselevzky, La democracía Cristiana chilena y el gobierno de Eduardo Frei (1964-
1970) (Mexico: Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana, 1987); and James Petras, Politics 
and Social Forces in Chilean Development (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1969). 
55 Pollack, The New Right in Chile, 1973-1997, 27. On Portales, see Alfredo Jocelyn-Holt 
Letelier, El peso de la noche. Nuestra frágil fortaleza histórica (Buenos Aires: Ariel, 
2000). 
 40 
observes that, “for the first time, [Conservatives] began to formulate a national project. 
Its language adopted concepts of order versus chaos, of promoting the technical rather 
than the political, of defending private initiative in the face of what they perceived as 
growing state interference, and of a preference for political authoritarianism.”56 Inspired 
by this nationalist fervor, the PN became an aggressive, anti-party force. Although the 
Right’s rhetoric deliberately proclaimed an “anti-Left rather than anti-system stance,”57 
the PN acted not merely out of its disapproval of Leftist and centrist state-led reform, but 
from a fundamentally anti-democratic perspective. In other words, it was not just that the 
PN would revolt against Allende’s socialist government when it won the 1970 election, 
but that the “New Right” which had emerged out of electoral disappointments was 
developing an ideology that rejected the democratic process (liberal democracy) 
altogether.  
The late sixties marked a time of widespread political action, increased dissent, 
and optimism in Chile’s traditionally marginalized labor and working classes. As the 
presidential election of 1970 approached, the Left and center-Left again turned to 
Salvador Allende, now leading a newly formed Unidad Popular (Popular Unity) 
coalition. Frei’s ultimate inability to solve Chile’s political and economic crises coupled 
with a region-wide movement toward the Left reassured the Left coalition that their own 
push for socialism was the correct one. The Christian Democrats, however, were more 
uncertain of full-blown socialism in Chile. In the end, its candidate, Esteban Tomich, 
represented the party’s left wing and argued for a kind of “socialism lite” program.  
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A charismatic doctor turned politician, who preached “the democratic road to 
socialism,” Salvador Allende offered an alternative of greater economic equality and 
social justice. To Chile’s privileged sectors and foreign investors, particularly those allied 
with the United States, the Unidad Popular represented the Partido National’s worst 
nightmare. While the “New Right” had become a profoundly anti-democratic force, 
Allende promised not only the deepening of democracy—via socialist reform—but the 
dream of a pluralistic society no longer controlled by the elites, operating outside of and 
against their long-standing acuerdo de caballeros. 
With the Right failing to heed the lessons of the 1964 campaign, it forwarded its 
own candidate, Jorge Alessandi, yet again, and the three-way split allowed Allende to slip 
in with 36.3% of the vote (as against Alessandri’s 34.9%) on September 3, 1970. Because 
neither candidate had won a majority vote, the final result would be determined by 
congress, an opening which allowed the United States to covertly attempt to derail 
Allende’s selection.58 When these measures failed in an embarrassing fashion, Allende 
was confirmed as Chile’s president. 
Allende’s election was an enormous victory for the Left, but it served as a 
crushing defeat for the traditional Right, which, with the defeat of Jorge Alessandri, had 
reached the end of its historical high-road. By the time Allende and the Unidad Popular 
stepped into office in November 1970, it was the “New Right” elements of the 
conservative movement that had already begun to articulate the challenge to Allende’s 
Chile. If the Right was ever more eager to remove Allende and the Unidad Popular, it 
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waited, however impatiently, for the right moment and proper support to do it. Despite 
the PN’s emerging hostility towards the democratic institutions that had symbolized 
Chile’s electoral history, a hostility that only fully coalesced when they could no longer 
control those elections or guarantee their outcome, the Right understood that the military 
would not act to oust him unless it felt that action would receive ample support, and that 
required winning over the Christian Democrats to their side. At the start of the UP 
government, harnessing Christian Democrat support proved difficult for the Right as both 
Allende and the PDC “shared a strong commitment to representative democracy” and 
social reform. 59 But by 1971, as Allende’s economic program (and the disruptions of a 
covert U.S. economic blockade) began to produce “shortages, rising prices, and black 
markets,” as well as the sense that there were political forces being unleashed by the 
Popular Unity which were operating beyond the historic boundaries of elite control, the 
PDC became ever more alienated from the UP. This process accelerated when center-
Right factions in the PDC asserted their dominance. 60 The severance of UP/PDC 
cooperation provided a window of opportunity for the Right to unite forces with the 
Christian Democrats and mobilize its opposition movement against Allende.  
By March 1973, Chile found itself in a state of social and economic chaos. With 
Allende’s government blocked at every move by an opposition-controlled Congress, and 
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their own supporters often acting autonomously, the president could not find a way out of 
the skyrocketing inflation, massive protests in the streets, and surging violence between 
the more militant UP supporters and adherents of the MIR (Movimiento de la Izquierda 
Revolucionaria), on the one hand, and hard-core authoritarian supporters grouped in 
Patria y Libertad, on the other. As the Right’s agenda became increasingly 
insurrectional, Allende’s fate was sealed. On September 11, 1973, with the covert 
encouragement of the Nixon Administration, the armed forces of Chile, led by General 
Augusto Pinochet, staged a violent golpe de estado. 61   
Framed around the notion of “restauración,” a “restoration” which stemmed back 
to the 1830s, the military’s overthrow of the Unidad Popular led to the suicide of 
Salvador Allende and what proved to be the collapse of Chile’s long-standing democracy. 
Subsequently, Chile’s political Right and armed forces united in what was proclaimed to 
be a “pronunciamiento”—a move to save the patria from civil war. Yet it would be a new 
set of political actors, the ultra-conservative, ferociously anti-liberal gremialista 
movement and a coterie of economists trained in monetarist theory at the University of 
Chicago, who would provide the ideological orientation for the military dictatorship that 
took shape after September 11th. And more, it would be the right-wing media 
establishment, El Mercurio, which would lend its voice and authoritative support to this 
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El Mercurio: The Traditional Voice of Untraditional Politics 
It is necessary to explain a bit of the historical background of El Mercurio in 
order to understand why the newspaper is fundamental to the articulation of a 
conservative historical vision in Chile, both during and, in this case, after the fall of 
Pinochet’s dictatorship. Because of El Mercurio’s centrality in conservative journalism, 
the historical narratives it has propagated since 1990 can point to the ways in which the 
Right has collectively represented Chile’s past over time and how conservatives intend 
that this contentious period in Chile’s history be remembered in the future.  
 For almost two centuries, El Mercurio has been considered Chile’s newspaper of 
record. It is undeniably the country’s leading conservative media outlet. First founded in 
1827 in Valparaíso by Pedro Félix but later re-located and reestablished in 1900 in 
Santiago by Agustín Edwards MacClure, El Mercurio has since remained exclusively in 
the hands of the Edwards family. Because of the extensive wealth and investments of its 
publishers, and because of its location at the heart of conservative politics in Chile, El 
Mercurio has acquired a degree of influence and power in Chilean society and politics 
unrivaled by any other media source.62 How El Mercurio came to dominate Chilean 
journalism—so much so that it became such a crucial element in catalyzing the 
overthrow of Allende and supporting Pinochet’s dictatorship – is key in understanding 
how the ideology New Right could gain such a popular foothold. 
Emulating the concept of “objective” and “impartial” journalism as symbolized 
by the London Times or the New York Times, El Mercurio63 early on garnered not only a 
                                                
62 Correa, Con las riendas del poder, 55. 
63 From now on, when I refer to El Mercurio, I am specifically referring to the edition 
published in Santiago.  
 45 
substantial readership but also the coveted reputation as being “de la naturaleza 
libertaria” [of a more objective nature].64 El Mercurio’s management recognized that in 
order for the newspaper to be taken seriously within Chile’s middle and popular sectors 
as a modern and objective press, it would need to abstain from establishing direct ties 
with the country’s party Right. To this end, El Mercurio claimed to be not just a framer 
of “public opinion,” which it most certainly was, but a “representante de la civilización 
chilena” [representative of Chilean civilization], even as it simultaneously catered to the 
interests of Chile’s ruling class.65 In other words, while El Mercurio maintained its 
stronghold within elitist circles, it broadcast its image as an unswerving supporter of a 
free press in a democratic society: it stood for the promotion of truth, for untrammeled 
freedom of expression, and for an objective journalistic practice. One of the more 
interesting aspects of El Mercurio is not just that it was able to claim objectivity while 
still representing the interests of Chile’s dominant class – that, after all, is a claim that 
many media outlets make -- but that it promoted itself as the very embodiment of Chilean 
identity and civilization, claims that only the most ideological of media make. 
 Yet from its birth up through the tumultuous years of the 1960s, the discourse of 
El Mercurio, in its news analysis as well as its editorial stance, was unquestionably 
capitalist, technocratic, and socially conservative. Directed by the corporation Grupo 
Edwards, El Mercurio’s fundamental loyalty resided with the country’s entrepreneurial 
sector and, for a long time, with the leaders of Chile’s Old Right. With the amalgamation 
of the Liberal and Conservative parties into the Partido Nacional and the mounting social 
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reformist movement of the late 1960s, El Mercurio took on a more overtly political role.  
Although leftist and student groups began to question its reportorial trustworthiness, El 
Mercurio still insisted on its differentiation from the political parties of the Right. As a 
result, it was able to promote a conservative ideology without undermining its status as 
Chile’s most powerful and politically independent newspaper.66 
 With the election of Salvador Allende, however, El Mercurio shed its “detached” 
image to become a vital player in the Right’s opposition movement. Unlike other 
conservative outlets, El Mercurio had a unique ability to speak to centrist sectors of 
Christian Democrats that had for so long trusted its “objective” and “impartial” reporting. 
For that reason, alone, it would become an indispensable platform for the conservative 
opposition as it mounted its movement to remove the UP.67 During the UP’s three years 
in office, El Mercurio’s news articles, not to mention its editorial stance, reflected an 
increasingly frantic anti-government tone, adopting a more sensationalist approach to its 
reporting of Chilean politics. But, as we will see, El Mercurio was far more than a 
propaganda machine. It would become the historical record – for a time, the only daily 
record – of what happened during those years.  
 While El Mercurio was and remains Chile’s leading conservative outlet and 
played an important role in the continuity of Pinochet’s brutal regime, this thesis is not 
concerned with issues of journalistic objectivity. Rather, if we are to understand how 
conservative thought in Chile not just recorded but represented the past in and for the 
present, El Mercurio becomes a vital source. To borrow from Pierre Nora’s lieux de 
mémoire, it can be argued that the archive of El Mercurio is a site of memory in Chilean 
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society. It represents where and how the Right in Chile recalls and refashions its 
memories of the past. As historian Steve Stern would suggest, El Mercurio is a “mirror of 
the nation.”68 Keeping in mind El Mercurio’s central role in the formation of Chilean 
conservative collective memory, we now turn to the reshaping of Chilean conservative 
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Chapter Two: Pinochet in La Moneda: The Ideology and Practice of Authoritarian 
Conservatism in Chile 
 
September 11, 1973, the day that Chilean armed forces attacked and disposed of 
Salvador Allende’s Unidad Popular (UP) government, marked a decisive break from 
Chile’s long-running democratic tradition. Since its independence, Chile had prided itself 
on sustained constitutional government and civilian rule. But on September 11, General 
Augusto Pinochet and three other military chiefs who made up the ruling Junta began 
systematically to decimate the democratic institutions that were the bedrock of Chile’s 
political identity. September 11, 1973 not only symbolized the demise of “la via 
democrática al socialismo” (the democratic road to socialism), it also foretold a death 
threat to liberal democracy in general. The bombing of La Moneda, the presidential 
palace, spoke loud and clear to those who would listen: politics in Chile was about to be 
severely restructured. Over the next seventeen years (1973-1990), Pinochet’s military 
regime fundamentally transformed Chilean political, economic and social life. As will be 
discussed below, this entailed the widespread removal of many opponents of the new 
regime and/or supporters of the UP by means of assassination, torture or exile, as well as 
the marginalization of coup supporters who opposed the growing repression of the regime 
and any opponents to General Pinochet within the Army. It also involved—and this is 
where our subject, El Mercurio, becomes key—the production and dissemination of an 
ideology which was politically authoritarian, socially conservative, and economically 





In order to discern how El Mercurio revised its historical narrative of Pinochet’s 
regime in the post-dictatorial period (chapter three), one must first set the record straight 
about what did happen between 1973-1990. The main target of the forces who carried out 
the attack on La Moneda on September 11, 1973 was the Left, as represented by Salvador 
Allende, those active in his governing Popular Unity coalition, and leftist forces outside 
his government (the MIR). However, what developed under Pinochet’s rule was not 
simply an attack on the UP, Leftists or those otherwise deemed “subversive” by Augusto 
Pinochet and his secret police. Rather it was an attack on liberal democracy itself. In a 
project that would later be called a “renovation” by El Mercurio, Augusto Pinochet and 
the three members of his Junta set out to destroy the political institutionalism that had 
existed in Chile prior to September 11, 1973. As such, Pinochet’s regime also targeted 
(although in less brutal fashion) moderate political parties who came to oppose the 
Junta’s methods (Christian Democrats, largely) and even the traditional conservative 
parties because what they sought was a return to the status quo ante.  
As we have seen, the years leading up to Salvador Allende’s election witnessed a 
crisis within Chile’s traditional (“Old”) Right. By the time Allende assumed office in 
September 1970, it was quite clear that the Right could no longer rely on its historically 
privileged position to win electoral victories. Thus, while the late 1960s and early 1970s 
saw the dawn of a new era in leftist politics, it had also led to a crisis in Chile’s 
traditional Right. By September 4, 1970, and continuing throughout the three-year 
government of Salvador Allende, various leaders from Chile’s traditional conservative 
coalition began shaping the Right’s ideological rebirth. The overthrow of Allende in 
September 1973 and the beginning of military rule—spearheaded by Pinochet, a man 
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with no previous ideological ties to Chile’s “Old Right”— led to the emergence of a new 
conservative agenda.69 During Pinochet’s regime—most notably in the decade between 
the mid-1970s and the mid-1980s—it would be the “gremialistas” with their authoritarian 
predilections, along with the Chicago school economists, who formed what has since 
been referred to as Chile’s “New Right.”70   
As Pinochet’s regime and the “New Right” had merged into a singular, 
hegemonic force by the middle of his regime, how a new, dominant conservative 
ideology unfurled, and how it was made manifest after 1973 is the focus of this chapter. 
Yet if seventeen years of military rule oversaw the emergence of a “New Right,” it 
concurrently created a significant ideological split in Chile’s conservative bloc. This split 
ultimately centered on whether the Right would form itself around authoritarian 
conservatism or attempt to reenergize a traditional democratic conservatism.  
El Mercurio, for its part, not only flourished its rhetorical sword to help depose 
Allende, but subsequently became the singular narrator of Pinochet’s regime and its neo-
liberal authoritarian ideology. Because El Mercurio served both as the producer and the 
reflection of the new conservative forces in Chile, I will explore the paper’s role in the 
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The Coup and its Consequences:  
 The swooping planes with their deadly missiles launched over La Moneda on 
Tuesday September 11, 1973 were only the beginning of what has been described as 
Chile’s darkest hour. Although rumors of a threatened coup had circulated widely for 
months (and one actual attempt that had been put down on June 29), few would have 
predicted the level of chaos and violence that ensued on that fateful Tuesday morning.71 
By the afternoon, Salvador Allende was dead and General Augusto Pinochet had seized 
control of the country. 72 Over the course of the afternoon, all pro-government radio 
stations had been forced off the air and the military’s voice alone resounded declaring the 
Unidad Popular a failure—a crisis in the democratic tradition—and calling for the 
restoration of civility in the country. By the evening, Pinochet and the three other 
members of his Junta—Gustavo Leigh of the Air Force, José Toribio Merino of the Navy, 
and César Mendoza representing the carabineros (a militarized police force)--appeared 
on national television to present the objectives and policy of their regime. As 
conservative political forces and other right-wing media outlets (especially El Mercurio) 
had been preparing the country for months by promoting an image of a Chile in threat of 
being overrun by a Leftist dictatorship, the Junta spoke of September 11 as a day of 
salvation from Marxist dictatorship and civil war. General Leigh declared that the Junta 
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would take all the measures necessary to rid the country of its “Marxist cancer,” save the 
country’s economy, and return it to civilian rule.73 
After the Junta’s first public address, few would have guessed that Pinochet’s 
regime would last for seventeen more years, becoming the single longest government in 
Chilean history. And certainly no one could have foreseen the degree of repression and 
injustice committed by the Chilean state on its own people. Over the course of Pinochet’s 
regime, more than 35,000 people were tortured, a documented 2,279 were killed (and it is 
likely that many more undocumented deaths remain to this day uncounted), and tens of 
thousands were sent into exile.74 The military regime, which began by exterminating its 
real and perceived enemies, ended by formulating a new state.  
Pinochet’s rule between 1973 and 1990 can be divided into three key periods. The 
first period, which begins with the coup and extends to roughly 1975, entailed cleansing 
the country of Marxism. The second phase (1975-1980), opened the move toward a new 
institutionalism in Chile by consolidating the political and economic basis of Pinochet’s 
regime. The final period, beginning with the implementation of the 1980 Constitution and 
ending with the plebiscite of 1988, marked the full institutionalization of Pinochet’s 
regime in both the economic and political spheres. This final period also witnessed the 
deepening of political divisions within the regime’s supporters, which produced the 
Right’s split into two main conservative parties, Unión Demócrata Independiente 
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(Democratic Independent Union, UDI) and Renovación Nacional (National Renovation, 
RN).75 
The First Period: Repressive  
The first phase of Pinochet’s government (1973-1975) was marked by clumsily 
constructed decrees and widespread repression. Despite his plan to rid the nation of 
Marxist influence, when Pinochet first assumed power, his regime lacked a coherent 
driving ideology. In fact, most actions undertaken by the Junta in this first period were 
deemed “emergency” measures designed to “cleanse” the country—politically, socially, 
and economically—of any UP influence and to resuscitate Chile’s shattered economy.76 
In the first several weeks of military rule, Pinochet systematically suspended or 
fully eliminated the most important political and governmental bodies that characterized 
pre-1973 Chile. Since he blamed democratic party politics for the crisis engendered by 
the UP, Pinochet closed Congress, outlawed pro-UP political parties (and suspended all 
others), asserted his control over trade union organizations and suppressed the main labor 
federation, imposed a strict curfew, took control of mainstream media by either censoring 
or disbanding radio, television and written press, and appointed military men as rectors of 
Chile’s main universities.77 
The early years of Pinochet’s rule were characterized by regime’s attempt to 
remove those considered to be “enemies of the state.” From the onset, the Junta insisted 
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“there [could] be no dialogue with [the] enemy, only elimination.”78 As reports, which 
began to appear as early as October 1973 insisted, this meant the kidnapping, torture, or 
assassination in clandestine detention centers of individuals who were suspected of 
opposing the military or of sympathizing with the overthrown government. In November 
1973, after those considered to be immediate threats had been removed, Pinochet 
established the Dirección de Inteligencia Nacional (DINA), a secret intelligence agency 
led by Army Colonel Manuel Contreras and reporting directly to Pinochet, to continue 
the “purification” of subversives in a more systematic fashion.79 
While it was clear that the Junta would not tolerate a return to pre-1973 Chile, it 
remained uncertain from the outset exactly how Pinochet would reform the country. 
While most leaders of the Right remained supportive, at least regarding the elimination of 
Marxism, the Junta’s lack of agenda led to internal political conflicts among its 
conservative supporters, a divergence that foreshadowed future splits within the Right. 
The first problem concerned how long military rule would last. Traditional sectors of the 
Right and Christian Democrats who had supported the coup called for a relatively quick 
return to civilian rule. Still guided by the historical practices of the “acuerdo de 
caballeros,” the Partido National promoted the restoration of political parties and 
electoral politics, although without the presence of Marxism. At the other end of the 
spectrum were the autoritarios (authoritarians), comprised predominantly by Jaime 
Guzmán and his gremialista followers who envisioned a complete transformation of 
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Chilean society which could only be carried out through an extended period of dictatorial 
rule.80 As we will see, this divergence, in many ways, was at the basis of two main 
memory narratives of Pinochet’s years in power, the “restorationist” and the 
“renovationist”.  
In 1974, Pinochet issued the Junta’s first communiqué, the Declaración de 
Principios del Gobierno de Chile (Principles of the Government of Chile). It addressed 
the Junta’s governing principles, and indirectly spoke to its intention to stay in power for 
a prolonged period of time.81 The Declaration also disclosed the growing influence of 
Jaime Guzman and the gremialistas (analyzed below) in the national planning 
organization, and therefore signaled that the authoritarian Right was emerging as the 
leading voice in the military regime.82 In the Declaración, Pinochet evoked the spirit of 
Diego Portales and imagined a return to what many Chilean conservatives suspicious of 
democracy had long seen as Chile’s golden era, the period of authoritarian rule in the 
1830s and 1840s that established a tradition of strong presidents, weak congresses, and a 
silent public. He revealed that the Junta intended to reorganize the country’s economy—
and concomitantly its social system—to ensure the freedom of the individual from 
government intervention. With the Junta’s intentions to remain in power publicly 
disclosed, Pinochet moved toward the creation of an economic program to put its goals 
into effect and a political strategy that could secure the stability it needed.83 
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The Second Period: Consolidating Power 
 While the first several years had succeeded in destroying much of Chile’s 
previously powerful social and political order, the second phase of Pinochet’s regime 
(1975-1980) saw the consolidation of military rule under the auspices of a New Right 
ideology. The years between 1975 and 1980 witnessed the emergence of a political 
project which combined neoliberal economic policy (derived from University of Chicago 
economists’ orthodox monetarism) with gremialismo, a political ideology which was 
based on Catholic traditionalism and corporatist social doctrine. As I will explore below, 
Pinochet’s political economic approach would translate to all facets of Chilean life and 
serve as the basis of being Chilean, “chilenidad.”84 First, the economic model. 
By the end of 1974, it was evident that the Pinochet regime’s initial efforts to 
rescue Chile’s failing economy were not working. The worldwide recession led to a steep 
decline in the demand for Chilean exports and inflation remained rampant. By this point, 
the Junta was in desperate need of an economic program beyond emergency decrees and 
the political measures needed to sustain it.85 As the regime’s supporters, in particular, 
Sergio de Castro, a prominent economist at the Catholic University, continued to blame 
the UP’s statism for the country’s financial crisis, Pinochet reached out to a group of 
economists at the Universidad Católica for advice. These economists, nicknamed the 
“Chicago Boys” because so many had received post-graduate degrees in the University of 
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Chicago’s economics department, endorsed Milton Friedman’s philosophy of a “new 
orthodoxy of monetarism and unrestrained laissez-faire” and were eager to apply such a 
model to Chile.86 Completely opening Chile’s market to foreign influence and privatizing 
all its companies seemed the first and most logical step in Pinochet’s plan. Soon the 
Chicago Boys found themselves appointed as the Government’s top advisers and 
economic ministers.87 As Brian Loveman pointedly notes, however, the Chicago Boys’ 
objective was not only to “rewrite the wrongs,” of the UP, but to “reverse the entire state-
interventionist trend that had developed in the 1920s.”88 It was clear that a neo-liberal 
“restructuring” of Chile’s economic and social order was, in part, a reaction to the social 
and political mobilization unleashed by the political accommodations set forth during the 
“compromise” or social welfare, state.  
Although the economy was deeply affected by a planned downturn in 1975, by 
1976, the country’s inflation rate had receded and exports increased, giving the 
impression that Chile’s financial crisis had begun to subside. Naturally, Pinochet and his 
supporters were overjoyed. While the economic program would later crash on the hard 
rocks of the recession of the early 1980s, its successes emboldened Pinochet and his 
advisers to think more globally about the nature of the changes they could achieve in the 
second half of the 1970s. 
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Gremialismo:  
Since 1975, the Junta and its Chicago Boys adherents were actively planning a 
new social framework where the dominant market relations within the economic sector 
would be imposed upon social relations as well. It was Jaime Guzmán, the most 
prominent supporter of gremialismo, who helped organize and articulate the political 
vision to go with neoliberal economics. As Marcelo Pollack argued, neo-liberalism and 
gremialismo “became the economic, ideological, and political pillars of the regime.”89  
The main tenets and underlying philosophy of gremialismo are not easily 
defined.90 As briefly mentioned, gremialismo’s roots can be traced to nineteenth-century 
Spain where Catholic social dogma and nationalist ideas of “hispanism” were 
experiencing a re-birth. By the mid-twentieth century, gremialismo had been deeply 
influenced by Franco’s corporatist (“falangist”) project. In Chile, gremialismo found a 
home with those in the Catholic Right, especially the prominent conservative historian 
Jaime Eyzaguirre. Gremialismo moved out of its reduced intellectual circles during Frei’s 
Christian Democrat government in the 1960s as it began to resonate with political groups 
that had become increasingly distressed by liberal democracy. It surfaced as an influence 
in the student movement of that time, under the intellectual leadership of Jaime Guzmán, 
a law professor at the Catholic University’s Law School in Santiago.91  
Somewhat ironically, gremialismo’s 1960s revival came from a desire to 
depoliticize Chile’s university system and student politics, which, for a variety of 
reasons, had become increasingly dominated by leftist parties. At the heart of 
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gremialismo was a belief that all “intermediary” institutions – not just civil society forces 
operating between the individual and the state, but economic institutions as well – must 
operate autonomously in society, free from state intervention.  These organizations, 
gremios, had a natural right to organize themselves and realize their own objectives 
independent from state control.92 According to gremialismo, the role of the state, then, 
was solely to serve in the realms of foreign affairs and national defense.93  
Gremialismo sees a strict hierarchy as the “natural” structure of society and in 
practice favors the hierarchical authority of a strong leader, a carry over from its 
conservative Catholic roots. In this societal structure, gremios, freed from state 
interference, can establish their own agenda and realize their own goals. According to 
gremialismo, because hierarchy maintains order it also fosters social harmony, and 
because the interests of the individual supersede those of society, the state cannot impose 
its agenda on man.  Yet for gremialistas, because the rights of the individual trump those 
of society, the social autonomy of gremios (the groups which connect these ontologically 
superior individuals) must be maintained. The notion of social autonomy as envisioned 
by the gremialistas is today most commonly referred to as “subsidiarity.”94  
As stated above, gremialismo re-emerged shortly after the 1964 election of 
Christian Democrat Eduardo Frei. But it flourished during Allende’s government as 
Jaime Guzmán was among the UP’s most vociferous opponents. In the months preceding 
the coup, gremios (everything from truck owners’ organizations to the professional 
associations of doctors) and the Movimiento Gremial de la Católica (Gremial Movement 
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of the Catholic University) constantly attacked Allende by organizing strikes and 
boycotts that publicly defied the government.  Indeed, gremialismo’s ability to reach out 
to a worried middle class and its increased involvement with the right-wing opposition 
movement helped fashion Allende’s demise.95 
In the immediate aftermath of the coup, the gremialistas became key proponents 
of the authoritarian position, advocating for the institution of a new “protected” 
democracy in which their views of society would be fostered. However, although 
Pinochet had appointed Guzman to his most important national planning committee, 
during the first several years of his rule, gremialismo remained restlessly in the regime’s 
shadow.  
Consolidating the Right:  
It was not until well into Pinochet’s regime, particularly after the first repressive 
period, that Guzmán and his main adherents fully embraced the Chicago Boys’ approach 
to economic neo-liberalism. While both movements maintained an anti-interventionist, 
depoliticized approach to government, Pinochet’s “Chicago Boys” and their neo-liberal 
counterparts were unrelenting in their belief that it was “the responsibility of individuals 
to defend their freedom rather than the gremio.”96 This naturally clashed with the 
gremialistas who were hesitant to merge with the neo-liberalist program for fear that it 
might dilute their own approach. However, as the first phase of dictatorship came to a 
close still lacking a political agenda that could rationalize both the junta’s “emergency” 
actions and the fact that Chile’s economy remained fundamentally weak, the gremialista 
concept of “subsidiarity” helped justify the dismantling of the state apparatus which both 
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gremialistsas and neo-liberals wanted, even though, in the end, it did not retain any 
protection for the “intermediary” groups which the gremialistas defended.97 Thus for 
their part, the gremialistas abandoned the more strident aspects of their corporatist 
agenda and recognized that neo-liberalism could provide “a monumental opportunity to 
carry out the political and social elements of their ideology.”98  
By 1975/6 and as the economic “shock” policy sponsored by the economists had 
finally started to spur economic recovery, it was clear that the neo-liberals and the 
gremialistas had finally settled their differences and converged. A neo-liberalized 
gremialista model which promoted a market-driven vision of both economic and political 
society had replaced the gremialistas’ historical vision of conservative corporativism as 
the Junta’s political project.99  
By 1977, with both the gremialistas and the neo-liberals on board, Pinochet began 
to take steps to legally ensure the permanence of a new, projected institutionality. In the 
Plan de Chacarillas which he issued later that year, Pinochet would reveal the regime’s 
intent to institutionalize its political and economic initiatives. Although he had not 
spoken to what would take the place of Chile’s historic liberal democracy, Pinochet 
nevertheless announced that the Junta would facilitate a transition back to civilian rule. 
The Plan de Chacarillas helped deflect pressure from Junta supporters who wanted a 
quick return to civilian rule, but it was vague in its time-table and in detailing exactly 
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what steps would be taken to move toward civilian rule or what that rule would look 
like.100 The regime’s opponents, for their part, remained skeptical of Pinochet’s plans, but 
the economic boom of 1978-9 helped Pinochet garner widening support among his elite 
allies. Indeed, the macroeconomic successes of the neo-liberal program (particularly for 
the elites) led the Chicago Boys to stake claim to a “Chilean Miracle.” In their eyes, no 
other country had such a successful economy. As 1979 came to an end, Pinochet 
carefully prepared the country for a new decade of military rule. His first step: the 
Constitution of 1980.101 
Third Phase: From Constitution to Plebiscite 
By the beginning of the 1980s, Pinochet’s regime, having consolidated its 
ideological framework, focused its energy on deepening its permanent hold over Chilean 
society.  Pinochet and his closest advisors began drafting a new Constitution that would 
stipulate the conditions for a “new Chilean democracy.” While Jaime Guzmán and the 
gremialistas assumed a leading role in this, the Chicago Boys, focused on a set of 
pervasive social reformulations (known as the “seven modernizations”) which included 
the privatization of social security as well as reforms in the areas of education, health 
care, agriculture, and justice. With the “modernizations,” the Chicago Boys would move 
toward their goal of depoliticizing and privatizing many aspects of Chile’s political, as 
well as economic, society.102 
In the political arena, the emerging Constitution was met by dissent within Chile’s 
conservative bloc. In particular, the disagreement concerned questions of the transition 
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away from military control as well as provisions for voting in the new system. The 
gremialistas remained critical of the concept of an expanded electorate characteristic of 
universal suffrage models both for ideological reasons and because they feared the 
revival of pre-1973 politics when Marxists could win power electorally. To this end, they 
proposed a drawn-out transition period in which their political beliefs could be fully 
enacted. They promoted the notion of a “democracia protegida” (protected democracy) in 
which the military would play a central role ensuring the stability of the homeland and 
while implementing the institutions embedded in the new Constitution. On the other 
hand, more traditional sectors of the Right stressed a quicker return to party politics and 
the re-implementation of a broad electoral system.  In their eyes, democratic rule entailed 
the freedom of the individual to elect representation at all levels of government. Like 
other indicators, this division on transition politics and electoral schemes foretells the 
eventual split between the two contemporary right-wing political parties, UDI and RN. 103  
Despite the differences, on September 11, 1980 exactly seven years after he first 
assumed control, Pinochet saw his Constitution ratified (even if in a suspect plebiscite, 
given that no electoral rolls existed when the voting occurred).  The passing of the 1980 
Constitution offered Pinochet not only a means of legitimizing his massive 
transformations, but also the opportunity to guarantee the legal basis of his rule for at 
least a decade, and possibly almost two decades. The Constitution decreed that Pinochet 
would remain President of Chile until 1989 when a plebiscite would be conducted to 
determine his (potential) extension in power until 1997.104  The Constitution stipulated 
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that electoral votes would count towards the election of the President and two-thirds of 
the Senate seats while the remaining one-third of the Senate would be automatic 
appointments. Two of the most controversial aspects of the Constitution were Articles 8, 
which made “class struggle” illegal and removed their political rights, and Article 24 
which declared the military as the ultimate arbiter and protector of the newly restored 
chilenidad.105 Other articles gave a “Security Council” made up largely of the military 
and its allies the right to lawfully intervene in the political process. 
In March 1981, the Constitution of 1980 became the official law of the land, and, 
as such, the date needs to be recognized as the “high water” mark of Pinochet’s regime. 
But the next several years would nonetheless see a sharp decline in the credibility and 
legitimacy of Pinochet and, especially, his economic policy. The worldwide recession of 
1982 led to a drastic decrease in the demand for Chilean exports. For a country that was 
completely dependent on foreign investment, this had devastating effects. As worldwide 
prices plummeted, domestic production dropped and inflation again began to rise 
precipitously. As Chile’s citizens, even those in the upper classes, began to feel the 
effects, and as it became clear that many of the free market reforms had simply opened 
the way for strategically placed financial groups to consolidate larger market shares for 
themselves, Pinochet and the Chicago Boys’ reputation diminished. Despite its efforts to 
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ignore the flaws in its free-market reform, ultimately the regime did what it had 
foresworn and intervened economically by devaluing the peso.106 
1983 to the Plebiscite  
 Ten years after the overthrow of Allende and the installation of military rule, 
Pinochet’s regime could no longer ignore or repress a growing opposition not only from 
the Left but even from certain sectors of the Right. Further, with the economic crisis of 
1982, even some prominent elite allies had become alienated from Pinochet and his 
prized neo-liberal reforms.  
 In August 1983 Pinochet opened conversations with some of his more moderate 
allies to devise a transfer of power that, he hoped, would maintain the security and 
integrity of his political project. While still adamantly opposed to a full reemergence of 
political parties, Pinochet, nevertheless, began talks with the democratic opposition and 
conservative leaders to “replace the neo-liberal economic team with a more pragmatic 
and flexible group.”107 He appointed the moderate nationalist, Serigo Onofre Jarpa, a 
former Partido Nacional Senator, as interior minister, with hopes that he would mediate 
the growing political tension. Yet it became clear that the two blocs were unyielding in 
their positions and despite modest efforts from actors on both sides, they could not reach 
political consensus.108 
 In the midst of a generalized and growing political opposition, all factions of the 
Right faced the decision of whether they would continue to “associate with the military 
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regime and [with] Pinochet himself.”109 This question, however simple it may appear, 
generated no simple answer or solution. In fact, it is precisely the Right’s inability to 
reconcile its perspectives of Pinochet, the man and his project, that has become the 
defining characteristic of conservative politics in Chile. As the end of the transitional 
period loomed, the Right had to decide how to prepare for the revival of party politics.  
For seventeen years, regardless of its internal divisions, the Right had maintained the 
privileged position to dictate national politics. Now it would have to confront the 
“possibility or impossibility of preserving the model and regime with a leadership 
different from that of Pinochet.”110 Would it organize as an authoritarian force that 
operated within a democratic framework, or would it re-embrace liberal democratic 
politics and define a new conservatism accordingly?   
One of the other main things to note about the split in the Right is that its 
divergence and inability to reach consensus regarding Pinochet was not a reflection 
simply of how its factions stood in relation to Pinochet’s actions during his dictatorship. 
It was also a result of the different ways the two Right parties which emerged envisioned 
Pinochet’s dictatorship within Chile’s broader history: as a period of democratic 
continuity—and therefore consistent with the longstanding conservative master narrative 
of Chile, or as a rupture in Chile’s democratic history which needed to be attended to? 
The way these two parties understood the meaning of Pinochet’s dictatorship would 
speak to the way each would construct a vision of the past that could serve in the post-
dictatorship contest for power. 
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 To the extent that it was unable to reach a political agreement in the years 
preceding the presidential plebiscite of 1988, the Right had dissolved into several de-
facto parties.111 Yet it wasn’t until the internal elections of 1988 that differences hardened 
and the factions officially split into two distinct parties: UDI and Movimiento de Unidad 
Nacional (National Unity Movement-MUN, later the RN). Although it was established in 
August 1983, by the latter half of the ‘80s, the Union Demócrata Independiente (UDI) 
became the most influential party within the Right. With Jaime Guzmán as its leader, 
UDI primed to become Pinochet’s heirs. From the outset, the party emphasized the 
deepening of neo-liberal relations and the consolidation of corporatist conservatism. UDI 
was loyal to all conditions set forth by the Constitution of 1980 and felt that it was its 
responsibility to protect and carry out the country’s new institutional order. On the other 
hand, the (MUN), precursor to Renovación Nacional, advocated dialogue with the 
opposition and welcomed the notion of political liberalization. The MUN/RN, with 
Sergio Onofre Jarpa and Andres Allamand as its main leaders, was seen as the 
descendent of the traditional Right’s Partido Nacional. Indeed, both men had been active 
in the PN’s leadership. While it was supportive of the last fifteen years of military 
government, it could nevertheless look somewhat critically at the actions taken during 
Pinochet’s regime—particularly surrounding human rights. As a result, Renovación 
Nacional (as it became by 1988) “became the only right-wing movement to contemplate 
a future without Pinochet”.112  
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 The transitional articles of the Constitution of 1980 stipulated that the military 
would put forward one candidate to stand for election in 1988 in a Yes/No vote. While 
some in the Right thought Pinochet was not the best candidate given the rise in popular 
disapproval, they were overridden by the general who insisted on standing for election, 
presenting the center-left opposition with a blatant target and the Right with a crucial 
choice. For some on the Right, a YES victory would validate the last fifteen years of 
Pinochetista rule and ensure its completion over the next decade. In addition, a win for 
Pinochet (and his UDI supporters) would mean that Guzman’s party could further 
develop its ideology and organize authoritarian principles within the framework of a 
civilian system. For Renovación Nacional, the plebiscite campaign sparked division. 
Some key players from RN joined the YES campaign while others, including the up-and-
coming Sebastian Piñera, who trained in economics at the Universidad Católica and went 
on to become a billionaire based on his successful introduction of credit cards into the 
Chilean economy, worked toward a NO victory. From their perspective, a loss for 
Pinochet would mean that the RN could run its own candidate in the forthcoming 
presidential elections.113  
As the plebiscite date approached, what remained beyond a doubt was the 
impending opportunity for political forces that had been bottled up for 17 years to re-
emerge. This meant notable changes in the ways in which Chileans who had been 
disenfranchised since 1973 would reconnect to the political system. In this context, it also 
suggested that the media, those who represented the political life of the nation to large 
numbers of people, could re-fashion their ideological positions in a new political 
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framework. In the months leading up to the plebiscite, as it would once Pinochet finally 
left La Moneda, the media became increasingly important in determining the meaning of 
both the past seventeen years of Pinochet’s rule and of the transition as it unfolded in the 
present. For the Right, this task lay in the hands of El Mercurio, not only because it 
played the privileged role of publishing while other media sources had been shut down, 
but because, in its role as a spokesperson for the Right, it had in the past provided a 
unified conservative perspective.  
El Mercurio Before and After September 11, 1973:  
El Mercurio, as we saw in the first chapter, has long been Chile’s newspaper of 
record, and this continued from a privileged position under Pinochet.114 Although over 
the last several decades, other news sources had emerged as Pinochet lessened his 
censorship rules, El Mercurio nevertheless maintained its status as Chile’s most 
important and influential media source.115 El Mercurio, however, is not just a shaper of 
public opinion; it refers to itself as the “representative” of “Chilean civilization.” In other 
words, El Mercurio not only informs the public in a particular way, it also claims itself to 
be the agent with enough cultural authority to determine what it means to be Chilean. 
Guillermo Sunkel put it best when he argued, “El Mercurio never defines itself within the 
context of any class-based interests, but rather within a national context, a context of the 
general good, of the moral values which underpin the unity of the nation.”116 In short, for 
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its owners and editors, how the country is represented in El Mercurio is how the country 
actually is.117  
It might be argued, then, that El Mercurio possessed the power to write a 
particular vision of the nation into existence, even more so when it was the only 
mainstream publication allowed to publish in the aftermath of Pinochet’s coup. Benedict 
Anderson has argued in his influential work that the nation—which he characterizes as an 
“imagined community”—came into being in chorus with the rise of print culture. He 
suggests that the latter helped generate the nation in so far as print can connect dispersed 
individuals within a shared political community. Newspapers, as Anderson says, 
“provided the technical means for ‘re-presenting the kind of imagined community that is 
the nation.”118 While Anderson’s work has been critiqued and supplemented, it 
nevertheless offers important insights as regards print media’s ability to foster a particular 
vision of this imagined community, which is certainly the case with El Mercurio.  
El Mercurio has been increasingly analyzed since the return to civilian rule in 
Chile in 1990. A documentary entitled “El Diario de Agustín” has recently been released 
in Chile to critical acclaim and numerous theses on the paper have been published at the 
Universidad de Chile.119 Scholars are focusing on El Mercurio as one of the main social 
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and cultural agents during the dictatorship. 120  El Mercurio’s complicity with a regime 
that has largely been condemned internationally for its human rights violations is being 
re-examined. Even though El Mercurio has yet to acknowledge its one-sided support for 
the Pinochet regime, the paper’s journalistic flaws—its lack of integrity, its 
misinformation vis-à-vis the arrested and disappeared, has been increasingly 
scrutinized.121 Those are important studies, but my own work focuses not on the 
newspaper’s moral stance vis-à-vis the Pinochet government, but rather on its role as 
arbiter of national identity, how it has represented chilenidad to the nation, both during 
Pinochet’s years in power, and most importantly, after he left Chile’s presidential palace. 
Understanding El Mercurio’s historical memory narrative will help us to understand how 
those who not only tolerated but supported Pinochet’s brutal regime saw themselves as 
acting within a particular narrative.  
Some of the most interesting work on El Mercurio suggests, following the broad 
lines of Gramscian theory that “the mass media can take on, in specific political-
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ideological contexts, the functions of a political party.”122These studies maintain that at a 
certain point—and some will argue that it begins at the height of the Compromise State—
El Mercurio stopped operating as an impartial and independent paper, supportive of the 
ideals of liberal democracy. 123 Instead it began to espouse authoritarian ideals and 
diffused them, because of its history and status in society, as if it were a political party 
working to bring its readers to action, in this case, against Salvador Allende and his 
Popular Unity coalition.  El Mercurio thus became a central player in the political 
struggles of the times, leading its editors to no longer see their task as presenting a 
conservative alternative in their editorial or informative sections, but rather to participate 
in the “councils of state” of the Right intended to hasten Allende’s political demise. 124 
A number of social historians have argued that El Mercurio, for most of the 
twentieth century, filled an ideological vacuum which existed among conservative forces. 
As one historian put it: “Given that the Chilean Right historically has not counted on the 
presence of important ‘intellectuals,’ their role has been filled by specific organizations 
and institutions, among which the mass media have played a central role.”125 This 
observation speaks to the key role played by the media, and El Mercurio in particular, in 
generating conservative political ideology. Since El Mercurio was the foremost outlet for 
the traditional Right, it was able—and at a certain level expected—to develop a political 
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discourse that more closely resembled that of a political party. Guillermo Sunkel agrees, 
arguing that El Mercurio not only articulated the concerns of the Right but helped it 
shape its ideology, even more so when Allende was president. 
During the three-year UP government, El Mercurio began to “educate” its readers 
about the perils of Marxism. While its rhetoric became more insurrectional in the latter 
half of 1973, still, for most of Allende’s government, El Mercurio condemned Allende  
as “totalitarian,” using its media platform to denounce the UP for depriving it of freedom 
of expression, which was paramount for a free society. It was also during this period that 
the paper began to redefine the how it thought about democracy—or at least what 
democracy was not: Allende’s brand of socialism. But a crucial component of El 
Mercurio’s discourse between 1970-73 was what Claudio Durán has named its 
“incitement propaganda” (propaganda de agitación).”126 Durán argues that El Mercurio’s 
agenda was not only to identify the government as an “enemy,” but to incite the 
opposition into action. Durán employs the phrase “Imagen Angustiosa del Mundo” (“The 
Anguished Image of the World” - IAM) to elucidate how El Mercurio helped create a 
visceral climate of fear in Chile. As he argues, El Mercurio depicted Chile and the world 
as existing in a state of chaos and disorder. Not only did the paper highlight everything 
from natural disasters to delinquency and international instability, but it did so in a way 
that placed the blame for all these crises on Marxism. El Mercurio used the frame of the 
IAM to lend weight to the argument that “Chile [is] sick” and that “The Popular Unity, 
controlled by Marxism, is incapable of making the country work and has produced an 
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economic crisis.”127 In this way, El Mercurio blamed (international and local) Marxism 
for any disorder and affirmed that the ideology cannot do anything to rectify its mistakes. 
Durán suggests that the IAM was one of five other frames employed by El Mercurio in 
the period between 1970-73 when it delivered its news: (1) the primacy of order; (2) 
Marxist violence; (3) attacks on democracy; (4) the UP’s incompetency; and (5) the 
international bankruptcy of Marxism.  
 In the period prior to the overthrow of Allende, El Mercurio helped formulate the 
“salvation” narrative, which Pinochet and his supporters later used to frame the coup and 
rationalize military governance. But El Mercurio also played a crucial role throughout 
Pinochet’s seventeen-year rule. As it was mentioned before, once the Junta assumed 
power, Pinochet, disbanded all forms of media that were sympathetic to the UP. El 
Mercurio, however, remained open and was converted into the Junta’s privileged media 
outlet.  
In so far as it was, at least for a short period, the only paper to continue 
publishing, El Mercurio ideology further reflected the Junta’s agenda. As Marcelo 
Pollack writes:  
 
During the Pinochet years, El Mercurio became the principal 
instrument of information and ideological direction of the different 
factions which constituted the ruling social and political bloc. 
While television and radio, which reached over 80 percent of the 
population, functioned as a means of communication for the 
popular sectors, El Mercurio performed the function of orienting 
and ideologizing the classes which adhered to it. While television 
tended to act as an instrument of cultural indoctrination over the 
masses, the written character of this long-established daily 
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validated it as an ‘oracle’, all knowing and all-powerful, like the 
Bible.128 
  
Still operating as an “educator” of the “ruling class” El Mercurio, particularly in 
the first period of Pinochet’s regime began to promote the need to “take apart the 
traditional political apparatus.”129 Instead of redefining democratic ideals—as was the 
case in the 1970-73 period—El Mercurio’s rhetoric became noticeably antidemocratic. 
As Sunkel notes, El Mercurio began to advocate for “an extraordinary, even radical, 
solution”—encouraging the destruction of the traditional mechanisms used to mediate 
civil and political society. It must be noted that the confluence between when El 
Mercurio became literally the only print media allowed after the coup and its decision to 
promote an authoritarian model of government is significant and highly consequential. 
This shift is even more notable given El Mercurio’s former orientation of supporting the 
“free press” as the only mechanism for “saving” democracy (under Allende).  
Throughout Pinochet’s regime, El Mercurio—its discourse and ideology—helped 
shape and promulgate the Junta’s neo-liberal project. But on a deeper level, El Mercurio, 
began to refashion Chile’s history by projecting an image of the Junta as the natural 
inheritors and protectors of chilenidad. Guillermo Sunkel highlights this as he notes, “the 
second important element of the political discourse of the period lies in presenting the 
Military Junta as the representative of a “historic effort” (gesta histórica) which was 
carried on over a long and difficult period in order to achieve Chile’s sovereignty.”130 
Thus while El Mercurio was an agent of the Junta’s neo-liberal agenda, its most crucial 
service to Pinochet was to historicize him—to place him and his government in a 
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particular historic framework and (eventually) to organize his legacy. El Mercurio, 
“actively participate[d] in the construction of [Pinochet’s] Historical Memory” even 
before Pinochet ha[d] left the Moneda.131 As we will see in the next chapter, El 
Mercurio’s ability to re-insert Pinochet’s dictatorship into a longstanding narrative of 
Chilean democracy continues into the post-dictatorship period.  
 
Chapter Three: El Mercurio —Re-Shaping Conservative History and Memory after 1990 
 
In this chapter, I explore the development of El Mercurio’s shifting historical 
memory narrative of the years 1970-1988 as it is constructed in the post-dictatorship 
period. To be sure, a study of El Mercurio’s daily output over the 1970-1988 period is 
central to analyzing any study of its larger representation of the dictatorship. But as 
Sunkel and Durán demonstrate (see chapter two), many have already interrogated this 
period. Rather, my central focus is on the changing ways El Mercurio, via its editorial 
and news articles, represents Allende’s government, the coup of September 11, 1973, and 
especially Pinochet’s seventeen-year rule, after Pinochet leaves the Moneda. By using a 
close reading of the texts, this discursive analysis seeks to elucidate how the self-
proclaimed “referente de la civilización Chilena” [“interpreter of Chilean civilization”] 
re-interpreted and revised Chile’s recent history.  It does so by analyzing the ways El 
Mercurio, between 1990-2004, inserted the Pinochet dictatorship into what historians 
refer to as a “whiggish” narrative of these troubling years. The narrative that emerges 
from El Mercurio’s writers and editors insists that rather than a break in Chile’s 
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democratic past, the Pinochet dictatorship is best understood as an attempt to strengthen 
democracy itself.  
Before exploring El Mercurio’s emerging revisionist account that began to take 
shape after the departure of Pinochet from La Moneda—a narrative that seeks to define 
how society should remember the dictatorship – it is critical to keep in mind what a wide 
variety of national and international sources have confirmed about the reality of 
Pinochet’s years in power. These sources have demonstrated (usually using fairly 
conservative metrics) that during Pinochet’s 17-year long dictatorship, approximately 
3,000 people died from political violence, the vast majority state-led, and there were over 
40,000 cases of Chileans tortured or abused.132 To put these figures into a comparative 
framework, the 3,000 Chilean deaths would be equivalent to about 40,500 deaths in the 
United States and more than a half a million confirmed cases of torture. Beyond these 
atrocious human rights abuses, Pinochet took a variety of measures to militarize the 
Chilean state and decimate the country’s previous democratic institutions. His regime 
closed Congress, insured the compliance of a supine judicial system, outlawed the parties 
which had made up the Popular Unity coalition and suspended all others, established new 
controls over trade union organizations, imposed strict curfews at will, took control of 
mainstream media by either censoring or disbanding radio, television and written press, 
appointed military men as deans of Chile’s main universities, and dismissed most social 
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science faculties.133  From these hard historical facts one observes that life in Chile 
between 1973 and 1990 was undeniably undemocratic.134  
Yet during the first fourteen years of restored civilian government (1990-2004), 
and even as its discourse incorporates a “counter-memory” that human rights abuses did 
occur, El Mercurio will nevertheless present a narrative of Pinochet’s dictatorship that re-
inscribes it as a time of progress towards the achievement of a “true” Chilean democracy. 
The post-dictatorial period reveals how Chile’s most influential conservative media voice 
worked to re-insert what was, by all conventional standards, not just a serious breach of 
democratic practice but a rule so reviled that Pinochet has become almost metonymic for 
dictatorship itself, back into a narrative of democratic progress.135  
This chapter, then, illustrates how El Mercurio has been able to paint a picture of 
a past that is, in so many respects, the opposite of what it actually was. In El Mercurio’s 
narrative, Allende, a democratically elected President, will be converted into a dictator 
and his Unidad Popular into a totalitarian government while the Pinochet dictatorship 
will emerge as a revolution of democracy and freedom. Yet much is at stake with 
inscribing such a positivist interpretation of Pinochet’s dictatorship. Despite turning 
history on its head, El Mercurio’s ability to insert Pinochet’s regime into Chile’s master 
narrative of unending democracy suggests, in a troubling fashion, that neither it nor the 
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conservative political forces it represents offer a sincere critique of the dictatorial period. 
More distressing, this suggests that if the individuals who were complicit with or 
responsible for the vast number of human rights abuses between 1973-1990 can, after the 
fact, re-write the history of human suffering into a period of democratic progress, then its 
leaves the way open in the future for a repeat performance.  
El Mercurio’s approach to the production of a positivist, post-Pinochet Chilean 
history is not original in relation to Chile’s longer historiography (see Introduction). Yet 
the newspaper’s ability to do so in the post-dictatorial period given the empirical 
challenge that Pinochet’s dictatorship presents, merits further investigation. Why has 
writing the history of this period been so fraught that, over the last eighteen years, 
different sectors of society have waged battles to define how this laden past will be 
remembered? As stated above, to the extent that the coup of 1973 and Pinochet’s 
dictatorship is certainly the most contested period in contemporary Chilean history, the 
pulls of “history” and “memory” contend to shape not just the meaning of this period for 
the present, but the meaning of the past in the present, how the past is made to matter to 
those who learn of it.136 As the years between 1973-1990 represent a recent past, issues 
of personal and collective memory conflate as individuals who actually lived the past 
contest their memories to emerging “historical” interpretations. Further, Pinochet’s 
dictatorship signified an exceedingly painful moment in the lives of many Chileans. Due 
to the nature of the repression, particularly his regime’s use of “disappearances,” many 
families and friends have yet, over thirty-five years later, to uncover the fates of their 
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loved-ones. Finally, to produce an historical narrative of Pinochet’s regime is to 
constitute Chile’s national history. As with most national histories, the stakes of 
inscribing a narrative of Pinochet’s dictatorship are extraordinarily high because it will, at 
a certain level, not only help to define a Chilean post-dictatorial political identity, but also 
frame a revision of Chile’s historical past. 137 These are the challenges to writing the 
history of Chile’s recent past and help explain why, in particular, it is useful to observe 
closely the way in which one active participant allied with the dictatorship, El Mercurio, 
has constructed a narrative of the Pinochet dictatorship from the vantage point of the 
post-Pinochet years.  
In the post-dictatorship period, El Mercurio’s political and cultural influence has 
waned somewhat.  As the years of the dictatorship wore on and eventually ended, El 
Mercurio’s monopoly grip on the print media in Chile declined as other print sources, 
and then competing TV, and, ultimately, internet news outlets emerged. Additionally, 
nearly twenty consecutive years of center-left government (via the Concertación 
coalition) have seen public (official) disclosures, truth and reconciliation commissions, 
continued public debate, and continual international attention about Chile’s recent past. 
Indeed, in these years significant work has been done to change the popular memory of 
Pinochet’s rule and to reveal El Mercurio’s role in both the overthrow of the UP and the 
stability of the military regime. These reasons, among others, have weakened El 
Mercurio’s ability to “write” the nation in the same way it had prior to 1990.138 
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Despite its changing reputation, El Mercurio is nevertheless still Chile’s 
newspaper of record. And, in spite of its support of a lengthy period of media censorship, 
El Mercurio still maintains what it claims to be its historic posture as an advocate of free 
speech and democracy. Of course, one can question how El Mercurio is able to defend 
Pinochet’s dictatorship at the same time that it defends its own reputation as an 
aggressive supporter of democratic ideals. As this is an essential question on an 
ideological level – how dictatorships can write themselves as democracies – this chapter 
will examine whether El Mercurio’s narrative of the past has changed as its own 
(privileged) position in political society—and concomitantly that of the Right—has been 
undermined or at least challenged by Pinochet’s exit from La Moneda, and then from 
governing power.  How do the traditional ‘winners’ re-evaluate and refashion their stories 
of the past when faced with political defeat? To what extent do they turn to “history” in 
order to gain or re-establish their (former) ideological hegemony, insuring that it is their 
memory that will influence how future generations come to view the past and its meaning 
in the present. For William Porath, a leading scholar of Chilean history and a professor at 
the Catholic University’s School of Journalism, the matter has already been decided: 
“The official history [of the past 35 years] will come slowly, but I believe it will be the 
version of El Mercurio,” he told me.139 Whether Dr. Porath is correct remains to be seen, 
but at the very least his words suggest the importance of paying close attention to the 
ways in which El Mercurio constructs this history and subsequently how the newspaper 
attempts to make its narrative “official.” 
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Methodology:  
As Jeffrey Olick has noted, “Changes in historical images…are not just one-time 
interactions between the meanings of the distant past and the needs of the present. Rather, 
from the moment being remembered, present images are constantly being reproduced, 
revised, and replaced.140 Keeping Olick’s words in mind, this chapter focuses on five key 
moments between 1990-2004 during which El Mercurio revises its narrative of the 17- 
year period of dictatorship into a whiggish interpretation, emphasizing the on-going 
(successful) struggle for democracy in Chilean history.  
As specific “commemorative” moments often times provide the means to judge 
change over time, I will use the anniversary of the Chilean coup of 1973 as one particular 
moment to assess how the past itself has changed. in an interpretative sense. My other 
time points include dates that mark the release of significant research and legal 
investigations which revealed much about the nature of Pinochet’s regime.  
 My first temporal point is March 1990, a moment that marks Chile’s transition 
back to civilian rule; the second comes in February 1991 with the release of the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission’s final report, the “Informe Rettig.” The third moment occurs 
in October 1998 with General Pinochet’s arrest in London. Next, I examine El 
Mercurio’s reports of the events surrounding the 30th anniversary of the coup—
September 11, 2003. Finally, I consider the paper’s coverage of the release of the 
“Valech” report from the National Commission on Political Imprisonment and Torture in 
November 2004.  
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These dates represent key moments when Chile, as a nation, has had to consider 
and engage with the specific history of the Pinochet dictatorship. And as such, they are 
moments in which social actors representing different political projects have attempted to 
inscribe a particular memory of the recent past on Chile’s political and cultural landscape. 
While others have examined the role of the political Left in this process of constructing a 
“counter-memory” to that of the Pinochet dictatorship, my work considers only the way 
in which the political Right, through El Mercurio, has re-examined its relationship to the 
past—at times to defend it, change it, acknowledge it, or ignore it – in light of cascading 
historical disclosures and documentation.  
My research methods were guided predominantly by a close reading of the 
newspapers. For each time-moment mentioned above, I examined El Mercurio for a 
month surrounding the event. For September 11, 2003, for instance, I began my analysis 
on September 1, 2003 and ended on September 30th. For some events, such as the release 
of Informe Valech, when news coverage spanned more than a single month, my analysis 
shifted accordingly—continuing through the first week of December 2004.   
The specific sections I focused on were news articles and news analysis taken 
from the front page, the national news section, and the editorial section—which included 
both El Mercurio’s formal editorial columns as well as invited opinion columns (i.e., “op 
eds”). I also, at times, studied the weekend Report (“Reportajes”), the Economics and 
Business section, and occasionally the weekend magazine supplements. My research 
targeted articles that specifically addressed or somehow evoked the past. The majority of 
the articles that analyze Chile’s history came from the opinion section while coverage of 
contemporary events surfaced in news articles and the news analysis sections.  
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Some central questions guided my reading of El Mercurio during these moments. 
The first is the fundamental historical inquiry: does El Mercurio’s narrative of the past 
change from date to date and if so, what new elements/ingredients does it employ to 
construct an understanding of the past that might reflect positively on Pinochet’s regime? 
Does El Mercurio’s account incorporate dissident or “counter-memory” narratives? If so, 
how does it approach those themes? Finally, if El Mercurio’s narrative evolves to reflect 
new perspectives and incorporate new realities of the past, then is it also the case that 
right-wing politics in Chile has come to understand itself differently and has absorbed the 
critique of its own past? Or has Pinochet’s regime been normalized in such a fashion as to 
allow the Right to maintain a fundamentally authoritarian ideology under the guise of a 
democratic framework?  
In my analysis I emphasize six specific themes in El Mercurio’s coverage: 
political institutionalism; economic and social modernizations; the concept of chilenidad 
(Chilean identity); human rights abuses; the symbolic interactions between Allende and 
Pinochet; and the question of History itself, including attempts to close off the past. As 
one or more of these themes emerge throughout the different dates, the reader discerns 
how El Mercurio constructs its narrative of democratic progress.  
I. The Return to Civilian Rule (March 1990) 
 
March 11, 1990 was a watershed in Chilean history for two interrelated reasons. 
First, it was the day that General Augusto Pinochet officially stepped down as ruler of 
Chile and the military returned the institutional political system to civilian hands. 
Pinochet, of course, would remain as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces until 
1998, at which point, and under the terms established by his own Constitution of 1980, he 
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became a Senator for Life. Second, this month also marked the return of a center-left 
government to Chile as Patricio Aylwin and his Concertación coalition, which included 
Allende’s Socialist Party, assumed power.141 
 How does El Mercurio—the paper that had for the previous seventeen years 
offered its unfaltering support to Pinochet’s dictatorship—interpret the transfer of power 
from Augusto Pinochet to Patricio Aylwin? In its coverage of the transition to civilian 
rule, El Mercurio will assert a Chilean “renaissance” narrative, stressing that between 
1973 and 1990 Chile experienced nothing less than a national re-birth. According to the 
paper, Pinochet and the Junta were not only the “saviors” of the nation, having rescued 
Chile from at the hands of the Popular Unity government, but more importantly, they 
were the “fathers” or the “founders” of a new democratic Chile. El Mercurio’s discourse 
invokes key themes of political institutionalism, economic and social modernization and 
nationalism to establish what could be called a renovationist narrative of Pinochet’s rule.  
Renovation and Restoration of Democracy in Chile: 
 On observing Pinochet’s exit from La Moneda in March 1990, El Mercurio 
credits the dictator with leading two projects that, at first glance, appear to be 
contradictory. Pinochet is honored for conducting both a process of democratic 
restoration and one of democratic renovation.142 The restoration refers to the return of 
democratic electoral processes when, on December 14, 1989, the Chilean people again 
went to the polls and elected as their president the leader of the Concertación, Patricio 
Aylwin. Even though Pinochet had suspended the Chilean electoral process in 1973; even 
though there are numerous credible accounts from Pinochet’s closest collaborators in the 
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military that he veered toward falsifying the results of the 1988 plebiscite and imposing 
emergency rule as it became clear that the voters were rejecting him; and even though the 
majority of historical accounts will credit the broad popular opposition movement 
beginning in 1982 with finally forcing Pinochet’s hand, El Mercurio still depicts the 1989 
elections as a gift from Pinochet.143 
The theme of “restoration” gradually merges into that of “renovation” as El 
Mercurio stresses the continuity between the out-going and the in-coming governments. 
In the days leading up to Aylwin’s inauguration on March 11, El Mercurio readers are 
inundated with photos, particularly on the front page or the first page of the national news 
section, of Aylwin and Pinochet together.  In the photos, the two men, often referred to as 
“los dos mandatarios” (“the two heads of state”), are seen conversing inside the nation’s 
“democratic” statehouses (See Appendix, Article 1).144 These photos convey political 
continuity—the stable and peaceful transition of power from one democratic leader to the 
next. There is nothing to suggest that Pinochet and Aylwin did not assume the role of 
head of state in the same way. To not represent the crucial difference that Aylwin was 
elected President whereas Pinochet seized power in a bloody coup and lost the only 
popular election he was part of, is key to understanding the manner in which El Mercurio 
shapes a history to accommodate its larger political narrative. Although a restoration of 
democratic electoral processes had, indeed, occurred, it becomes blurred to the extent that 
it is narrated as a transition—a passing of the presidential sash between two legitimate 
heads of state.  
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As El Mercurio represents it, the restoration of democracy in Chile was not only 
one mission of Pinochet’s government but its central task, and the transition to civilian 
rule certified that it was a “misión cumplida” (mission accomplished.) 145 In that sense 
“restoration” (understood as the return to democratic governance after a period of 
absence) was conflated with an opposite term, “renovation,” which implies that under 
Pinochet, democracy was never really abandoned. In an op-ed piece entitled “Presidente 
Pinochet,” Juan Eduardo King writes, “I feel a need to say that President Pinochet carried 
off this period of transition initiated on October 5, 1988 in an impeccable fashion.”146 
Many op-ed pieces in El Mercurio comment on the nature of the transition back to 
democracy, emphasizing the military’s central role in its peaceful orchestration: “Chile’s 
military was not expelled from power. They began to return [devolver] power [to the 
civilians] voluntarily and systematically.”147 With the verb “devolver”—to return—the 
author displaces agency from the electoral process, a process increasingly impelled by 
anti-Pinochet protesters, and instead privileges the military’s role.  
To emphasize this interpretation, writers in El Mercurio argue that a restoration of 
the democratic electoral process was always Pinochet’s plan, although his own speeches 
make little reference to this for many years: “On being defeated in the plebiscite of 
October 1988, Pinochet never doubted in the least that he would hand over [entregar] 
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power, according to the calendar established [by the Constitution of 1980] on March 11, 
1990, and this is exactly what he did.”148 The reader again observes the intentional use of 
the word “entregar”—to hand in/deliver—which stresses Pinochet’s intention to return 
Chile to civilian rule. Again, one should keep in mind that the historical record suggests a 
very different process in which Pinochet “flirted with the idea of ignoring the electoral 
results… [H]e denounced his advisors, demanded emergency powers, and then 
impetuously threatened to resign when other members of the junta counseled against the 
maneuver.”149 The restoration of democracy is presented not as a process whereby a 
dictator is removed from power following a popular rejection and a stern warning from 
his fellow generals, but rather as the gift from a leader who voluntarily and 
democratically gave it back.  Further, throughout the first eight years of Concertación 
governance (1990-1998), Pinochet would constantly threaten to return to power if the 
Concertación, in his words, “touches even one hair on the heads of my men.”  
For El Mercurio, the theme of democratic restoration allowed it to narrate a Chile 
that never really detoured from democracy during the Pinochet years. In an editorial from 
March 11, entitled “La Restauración de la democracia” (“The Restoration of 
Democracy”), the newspaper figuratively merges Aylwin and Pinochet, giving them 
equal standing and, again, crediting the military for having upheld this passage to 
democracy:  
The presence of both leaders represents a foundation of republican 
continuity, which is essential in order to assure the political stability of the 
country…[and that] the transition to democracy is able to reach its 
culmination. …The whole country, and especially the Armed Forces and 
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forces of Order, are those who have led this process, and they should be 
very proud of what they have done.150  
 
As the Armed Forces are given the responsibility for the return of civilian elections, 
Aylwin becomes a figure not of change but of continuity. Whereas this move indicates a 
political displacement, in which the figure of change (Aylwin) becomes somehow 
complicit with Pinochet, another move in the same editorial marks an important historical 
displacement: “The transition thus has reached its culmination. Now no one can doubt 
that Chile has returned to full democracy.”151 The syntax of this sentence is key. Where 
El Mercurio could have suggested that the country’s transition process would begin with 
Aylwin’s presidency (thereby implying that the success of the transition would depend, 
as the success of all such transitions) on the willingness of the military to return to the 
barracks and not threaten a return to power, instead it sees this moment as the 
culmination of the transitional process. To suggest that the transition has ended now that 
Pinochet is no longer President essentially makes Aylwin accountable for any ensuing 
“failures” of democracy and relieves Pinochet from that burden, regardless of his 
behavior. This point is further driven home when El Mercurio reports Aylwin’s vow to 
maintain the “historic institutionality” of the Fuerzas Armadas. For El Mercurio, while 
full democracy has been restored in Chile, its permanence rests on the Concertación’s 
pledge to preclude civilian attempts to meddle with the Armed Forces. Thus, challenges 
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to Chile’s restored democracy will not be due to any threats that the military will place on 
the civilian government (which will happen frequently).152   
  In that sense, then, El Mercurio credits Pinochet for restoring democracy, while 
also pointing, in broader terms, to Pinochet’s renovation of Chile’s political system and 
the (new) democratic social order it engendered. As one op-ed suggests, “[Pinochet] tried 
to put his vision for what would be best for the country in an institutional framework.”153 
In a salient news article entitled, “Impulsan Amplia Reestructuración,” (“Projecting a 
Broad Reconstruction”), El Mercurio quotes from the president of the Supreme Court as 
he concludes, 
In our country…we have been actors as well as witnesses to the 
triumph of democracy. The Chilean people have influenced the 
open enthusiasm of the Supreme Government to begin with 
renewed energy on the road to liberty, to a [renewed] faith in man, 
and to the full observance of law, the only guarantee of human 
dignity.154 
 
The Supreme Court President—and here it must be stressed that the Supreme Court 
remained loyal to the military government until long after 1998—once again highlights 
the end of the transition and, thus, the triumph of democracy. Pinochet’s rule has past 
and, as the Supreme Court President continues, it is that rule that has enabled Chile to 
emerge to a new stage of liberty and freedom:  
As citizens, we are grateful for this new stage and we ask God to 
enlighten the new government with the ability to lead the country 
in democracy, using the path of reconciliation, peace and truth, so 
that the dignity of the rights of man will always be the basic 
                                                
152 El Mercurio, March 8, 1990 “Aylwin a Pinochet: No Alterará a la institucionalidad de 
las FF.AA,” A 1. It is important to note here that between 1990-1998, Pinochet constantly 
threatened Concertación leaders who made efforts to alter his political legacy.  
153 El Mercurio, March 25, 1990, “La Revolución que Nadie Conoce” A2. (Appendix, 
Article 2). 
154 El Mercurio, March 3, 1990, “Impulsan Amplia Reestructuración,” A1.  
 91 
principle which guides and animates the actions of each one of 
those who carry on their shoulders the heavy responsibility which 
comes with leading the nation to the achievement of its common 
interests.155 
 
In this excerpt from 1990, the chief magistrate of the judicial body that will, for the next 
decade, consistently rebuff any legal challenges by human rights groups to Pinochet and 
the military, implicitly links Pinochet, who has led “us” to this day, to the observance of 
human rights and the continued search for the “bien común.” 
 In a notable editorial, “Restauración de la Democracia,” (“Democracy Restored”, 
which would be more accurately translated as “Democracy Re-Invented”), El Mercurio 
summons all Chileans to feel pride in Chile’s new democracy and all that the military 
regime has bequeathed them.  
The military put on their shoulders an historic responsibility. From 
the very first moment, they declared their intention to restore the 
lost democracy, and they committed themselves to that task with 
seriousness and with the energy to accomplish all the necessary 
transformations needed to reach institutional, social, and economic 
renovation.156 
 
While El Mercurio constantly encouraged its readers in this crucial month that “we will 
never forget…that we were capable of lifting Chile from ruin, and that we have built a 
new, modern, and booming country,” it will also suggest that it was Pinochet who 
established a whole new kind of democracy.157 An editorial from March 25 entitled, “La 
Revolución que Nadie Conoce” (“The Revolution that No One Knows”) further 
illustrates this point: 
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How does one translate the Chilean case to the Third World as a 
whole? The people who reached power in 1973 realized that not 
only was a democratic civilization not flourishing [in Chile] – an 
image which the world’s intelligentsia adopted – but rather all that 
remained in this polarized country was the formal skeleton of 
democracy… [T]hey realized that they had to do something more 
to prevent the reestablishment of the system which existed before, 
to prevent the return of the leaders of yesteryear. They had to build 
a new institutional superstructure, and the model which they chose 
was the same one which had allowed Chile to become a clear 
example for the great part of the world during almost all the 
Nineteenth Century.158 
 
Through this editorial, El Mercurio makes several crucial points. In the first place, it 
insists on the fact that it wasn’t Pinochet who challenged democracy in Chile, it was 
Allende’s government, and, by implication, the weak (reformist) governments that 
preceded it. In the place of democracy’s feeble (pre-coup) skeleton in Chile, the Junta 
constructed a robust new democracy. In the second place, El Mercurio suggests that the 
military could accomplish this only by creating a “new” institutional order, an order 
which pointed back to the nineteenth century, and a golden age when Chile was the envy 
of the world.  This excerpt reveals El Mercurio as it removes Allende from Chile’s 
democratic narrative and inserts Pinochet into his place.  
The Constitution of 1980 often stands at the center of El Mercurio’s whiggish 
narrative, the concrete proof that Pinochet’s rule was not a deviation from democracy but 
rather a well-conceived plan to renovate it. In a March 8th news article, El Mercurio 
quotes Pinochet as he notes that “The political constitution approved in 1980 and ratified 
in 1989…came to definitively consecrate the democratic values which our government 
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supported.”159 Of greatest importance here is the sacrilization of the Constitution of 1980, 
the assertion that not only was democracy highly valued by the dictatorship, but it was 
only through Pinochet’s efforts—most notably, his Constitution – that Chile has 
democracy. (As I noted in the previous chapter, the Constitution of 1980 seriously 
revised some basic tenets of liberal democracy, refusing political participation to those 
who held certain beliefs and filling the upper chamber of the legislature with unelected 
senators).  
Further, El Mercurio suggests that through his Constitution, Pinochet achieved 
political consensus (a consensus that did not exist in reality) and has thus garnered the 
support of President Aylwin and his Concertación alliance, “The new authorities have 
understood that these advances only were possible thanks to a very profound change in 
the focus of government, such as placing liberty and personal initiative ahead of the old 
state.”160 By showcasing a consensus that does not exist, particularly one that cast the 
dictatorship as the sponsor of “liberty” and the government previous to Pinochet as 
representing the “old state,” El Mercurio rhetorically connects the new government with 
Pinochet’s project.  
 By arguing that the Pinochet regime renovated democracy in Chile, El Mercurio 
reverses history discursively: Allende becomes the dictator and Pinochet the democrat. In 
the same sense, the paper will suggest, within this renovation frame, that Pinochet and his 
government did not just “right the wrongs” of the Popular Unity, but went further to carry 
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out a democratic revolution: “[Chile] is, in a word, a country which has experienced a 
revolution: a revolution which, truly, was successful.”161 In the opinion piece entitled 
“Memorias del Gobierno” (“Memories of the Government”), which argues that only 
Pinochet has achieved what had been attempted unsuccessfully in the past, the 
anonymous author places Pinochet in comparison with both Allende and the Christian 
Democrat Eduardo Frei, noting that while these two “socialists” failed to bring about “a 
complete renovation of national life,” Pinochet succeeded beyond all expectations:  
…it is interesting to note that the programs of the last three presidents – 
Frei, Allende, and Pinochet – all had the same goal, although they 
employed different terminologies. But if one measures [their success] 
from the standpoint of achieving their aims, of the three, the military 
regime was the only one which could be considered to have achieved them 
in a very high degree.162 
 
The comparison is notable because it suggests that the military regime acted not against 
the “socialist” Allende, but rather against Chile’s tradition of reform governments. To be 
sure, the article does not consider either the violent methods Pinochet used to achieve his 
ends or the fact that the general was in power for 17 years while Allende was violently 
overthrown after only three. Yet more important for my discussion is that El Mercurio’s 
narrative works to invert the facts of Chile’s history, placing the Pinochet regime within a 
positivist narrative that sees Chile’s history as a journey to democratic fulfillment. Thus, 
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Allende becomes the dictator and Pinochet the democrat; Pinochet the revolutionary and 
Allende the conservative state bureaucrat. 
 At this first temporal point, March 1990, then, we can see how El Mercurio 
begins to construct a narrative with two central threads, both of which identify Pinochet 
with a democratic project. One, the restorationist, will credit Pinochet with returning 
Chile to a full-fledged democratic government, modeled on those who brought Chile to 
glory in the nineteenth century.  The second, renovationist, argued that Pinochet’s 
intention to leave Chile with a stronger democracy had become nothing short of a 
democratic revolution. With these narratives in place, the paper also firmly establishes 
the success of Pinochet’s project and declares that it has garnered broad consensual 
support and, therefore, is unassailable. All parties have agreed to Pinochet’s terms; 
history is over and cannot be reopened. Indeed, to do so, to “go back in time,” as it were, 
would undermine the nation’s reconciliation process. As such, El Mercurio’s approach 
carries an implicit threat to the Concertación that it should not attempt to “alter” or even 
examine the past. El Mercurio will employ these unifying themes repeatedly throughout 
the post-dictatorship period.  
****** 
II. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission Report (February 1991) 
Two months after assuming office as the first democratically elected President of 
Chile since Allende, Patricio Aylwin, convened a National Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission to investigate the gross human rights violations that had been committed 
during Pinochet’s regime. This eight-member body, lead by Raúl Rettig, a well-respected 
lawyer, ambassador and former minister from the Radical Party, was allotted nine months 
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to report on human rights violations during the military’s rule. Although the Commission 
was restricted to investigating only murders and disappearances (i.e., presumed killings), 
the Commission’s main goals were, nevertheless, to reveal the causes and circumstances 
of political deaths during the previous regime and to determine, to the extent possible, the 
victims’ fates. The Commission began work in March 1990 with an extensive 
interviewing process that culminated on February 11, 1991 with the submission of its 
final report to President Aylwin. President Aylwin disclosed the major findings of the 
report to the public in a televised national address by in March 1991. In this speech, 
arguably the most significant of his presidency, Aylwin called upon the entire Chilean 
nation to recognize “the moral unacceptability of human rights abuses perpetrated by 
state agents,”163 and the need for a better future contingent on the “moral reconstruction 
of society and the consolidation of democratic institutions.”164 
The release of the Rettig Report, as it became known, was thus the first time the 
military government— and its credibility and “salvation” legacy—was directly 
challenged by the new government. It marked the first time the regime’s own “official” 
history confronted a counter-narrative delivered not by opposition politicians, but rather 
by an authorized governmental entity. The very fact that El Mercurio reported the Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission and the release of its report is telling in and of itself. One 
must acknowledge that for El Mercurio – the singular media voice of Pinochet’s 
regime—allocating print space to an issue that subtracted from the military regime’s 
credibility was noteworthy. As Ignacio Aguero argues, El Mercurio still had not 
acknowledged the extent to which it misinformed its readers about the disappearances 
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that occurred during the dictatorship.165 El Mercurio’s coverage of the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission’s 1991 findings, then, is a central moment to see how it will 
incorporate what might be called an “inconvenient truth” into its historical account of the 
military regime, a history that it has already claimed was based on a mission to provide 
Chile with a functional and modernized democracy.166 
 Throughout February 1991, one observes the way in which El Mercurio uses the 
Rettig Report and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission itself as evidence not of 
Pinochet’s abusive rule but rather as a way to mark Chile’s road to progress. Although it 
could no longer deny that human rights abuses occurred, El Mercurio maintained a 
defensive posture towards the Rettig Report. Even as its news articles and editorials 
stressed that the report should in no way challenge the military’s amnesty laws, most 
notably the broad Amnesty decree which Pinochet authored in 1978, El Mercurio 
simultaneously established a “bad apples” narrative to absolve Pinochet and the military 
of criminal responsibility.167  
Amnesty Law of 1978 and the Closure of History: 
 For El Mercurio, the very task assumed by the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission – the interrogation of the past – is problematic. As such, the paper will 
attempt to discursively close it (history) off by suggesting that historical inquiry itself 
challenges the authority of the Constitution of 1980 and therefore threatens Chilean 
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stability and the nation’s democratic renovation. Consequently, right-wing opposition to 
a proposal to strike down the military’s amnesty, becomes a rallying point for El 
Mercurio to defend Pinochet’s regime and, concurrently, its positivist narrative of his 
rule.168  
In a news article, El Mercurio quotes Andres Allamand, the leader of the 
conservative Renovación Nacional Party (RN) as he notes, “therefore, the 1978 Amnesty 
[decree] should be kept – it is legally indispensable, politically necessary, and is a 
positive element in the desire for reconciliation.”169 El Mercurio will acknowledge the 
past; its choice is not to negate the revelations now emerging from the government. But at 
the same time the paper will implicitly suggest that “too much history” could yield 
negative consequences for Chile’s new democracy. Thus, if El Mercurio’s first move in 
March 1990 is to recast the history of the Pinochet regime, with the Rettig Report it will 
imply that there are dangers to the present (and future) in looking too deeply into the past.  
 To the extent that Chile’s dark past of torture and disappearances has been 
examined by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, El Mercurio will claim that 
Rettig’s is a one-sided view of history that errs by failing to explain the historical context 
in which human rights were violated. El Mercurio gives ample coverage to RN leader 
Andrés Allamand who argues just this point: “If one wants to reach the complete and 
historic truth about what has happened in Chile, it is fundamental to take note of the 
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background, the causes which set the stage for the violation of human rights in Chile.”170 
According to Allamand, human rights violations ensued as a result of the chaotic social 
and political context generated by Allende’s government. From Allamand’s outlook, 
Pinochet’s amnesty was a correct act and must not be challenged.  
 Several other editorials that address the Rettig Report broadly assume this same 
defensive posture, and are wary about probing the Pinochet period too deeply. As an 
editorial from February 3 entitled, “La Concertación en 1991,” suggests that 
Historical forgetfulness has led the leaders of the governing 
alliance, who previously challenged the country’s [growing] 
success and, even earlier, failed to acknowledge the danger which 
totalitarian Marxism and its armed cadre presented, to now become 
the accusers and judges of the forces which, heeding the call of a 
democratic citizenry, had to suffocate the extremist revolutionary 
plot.171  
 
For El Mercurio’s editors, the Rettig Report signifies an unwarranted incursion into the 
field of history. Their editorials scantily address the subject of the report itself—the 
disturbing and dark past it unearths – but rather focus on the “forgetfulness” of the Left 
(i.e., the Concertación government). According to El Mercurio what has been “forgotten” 
is defiantly not the human rights abuses of the Pinochet government, but rather the 
actions of “totalitarian Marxism and its armed cadre.” In another reversal, Allende’s 
supporters, having conveniently “forgotten” their past, become responsible for the abuses 
that followed—while El Mercurio refrains from passing judgment on the actions of the 
military government.  
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 In several editorials, however, El Mercurio does remind its readers who is the real 
threat to Chilean democracy. In “Amenaza Comunista” (“Communist Menace”), for 
example, the editors argue that the real threat from Communism is not its terrorism, but 
its willingness to break from Chile’s democratic tradition at any moment: “The behavior 
of Chilean communism betrays a surprising stubbornness which suggests that their 
devotion to democracy, today as yesterday, is a promise that can be unilaterally severed 
at any moment.”172 Because of this, according to El Mercurio, Chile must not allow the 
Communists to define “what democracy is [or] what human rights are and how they 
should be protected and defended.”173 Again, El Mercurio has reversed the field of 
history. In Chile it was the Left which was elected democratically in 1970 and the 
opposition Center-Right which “unilaterally severed” its “devotion to democracy” three 
years later. Indeed, it was the Chilean military that, according to the Rettig Report, 
violated human rights on a massive scale. While El  Mercurio’s coverage of the Rettig 
report accepts the confirmation of large-scale human rights violations under the military 
government (as opposed to denying that anything untoward occurred, as Pinochet himself 
would continue to maintain almost until his death), it discursively blames the violations 
on the Left and disputes their right to raise any critiques at all. 
Nunca Más: 
After the release of the Rettig Report, El Mercurio incorporates the slogan “Never 
Again” (Nunca Más) into its narrative. The phrase, of course, was borrowed from post-
Holocaust discourse to emerge as the slogan of human rights movements throughout 
Latin America. “Nunca más” has since the 1970s become a way to call upon the national 
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and international community to bear witness to the abuses that occurred in the past and to 
work to ensure that these violations never happen again. Despite its origins, however, the 
phrase over time has been adopted by sectors of the Right, and even by Pinochet who 
appropriated it, suggesting the instability of even the most historically grounded signs. 
For Pinochet, “never again” would Chile return to the conditions of 1970, with an elected 
Socialist president and a left-wing government.  
El Mercurio also integrates “nunca más” and the perspective that “human rights 
violations should never happen again,” into its discourse.  But as several news articles 
suggest, El Mercurio uses the phrase both to absolve Pinochet from any legal 
responsibilities for his actions and to seal off the past from further exposure. Further, for 
El Mercurio, human rights violations happened but they were committed by some “bad 
apples” who, responding to the needs at the time, did what they thought was best for the 
stability and progress of the Chilean nation.  
In addition, El Mercurio’s adoption of a social justice slogan underscores its 
perspective that changing the Amnesty Law—which it sees as altering the past—would 
legitimize a subjective reading of history and, consequently, threaten Chile’s newly 
restored democracy. El Mercurio frames this discussion of human rights as a warning: If 
Chile continues to examine the past—if it goes beyond simply acknowledging the past 
(as the paper, itself, has done in its news articles and editorials), democracy will itself be 
endangered. In other words, returning to the theme of history and memory, El Mercurio 
will accept that these new disclosures (“subjective” and “uncontextualized” as they are 
characterized by the paper) can have a meaning “for” the present – as History – but they 
cannot have a meaning “in” the present – as Memory; they cannot be a cause for action, 
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only study. But as with its reporting a year earlier, El Mercurio’s reports on the Rettig 
Report leave it up to the reader to determine what would happen and who would 
jeopardize Chilean democracy if the past were to be fully examined and made meaningful 
in the present.  
****** 
III. Pinochet’s Arrest in London (October 1998) 
 Pinochet turned over executive power to a civilian government in 1990, but that 
did not mean he relinquished all his institutional controls. To the contrary, he continued 
to serve as Commander in Chief of the Army until 1998, a post from which he frequently 
harassed both President Aylwin and his successor, Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle (son of the 
Christian Democratic president from 1964-1970, Eduardo Frei Montalva). That title he 
would only give up in 1998.174  Shortly after finishing his term as Army head, Pinochet 
traveled to London on an arms purchasing trip, to visit his close confidant, Margaret 
Thatcher, and for a routine surgical procedure on his back. While in London, Pinochet 
was detained by Scotland Yard personnel acting on an international arrest warrant filed 
by Spanish Judge Baltasar Garzón on a variety of charges. Specifically, the warrant 
which called for Pinochet’s extradition to Spain charged him with 94 counts of torture 
and the assassination of Spaniards in Chile during his dictatorship. Pinochet’s case 
unfolded over sixteen months of intense dispute in a variety of London courts, ultimately 
landing with the Law Lords, Britain’s closest equivalent to the U.S. Supreme Court.  
The issue before the Law Lords was whether Pinochet could be extradited to 
Spain to face trial. The courts questioned the lawfulness of “sovereign immunity”—a 
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concept whereby heads of state were exempt from prosecution for crimes committed 
during their time in power by virtue of the fact that they were acting on behalf of the 
state. The Chilean government, under President Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle, defended 
Pinochet’s immunity because of his status as former president and the current immunity 
he enjoyed as Senator-for-Life.  The prosecutors (along with human rights organizations 
and the United Nations) argued that Pinochet should be extradited under the notion that 
crimes against humanity are subject to universal jurisdiction and can be tried anywhere if 
there is strong evidence that they won’t be brought to justice in their own courts. 
The House of Lords ultimately rejected Pinochet’s defense and, in the process, 
created a new standard in international law by denying claims of sovereign immunity for 
such charges as crimes against humanity and genocide. Ultimately, the Law Lords would 
only charge Pinochet for crimes occurring after 1988 (the date when the UK adopted 
legislation from the United Nations Convention against torture).175 Irrespective, Pinochet 
was released to Chile on March 3, 2000 after Home Secretary Jack Straw determined that 
he was unfit to stand trial in Spain. Yet the Chile that Pinochet returned to was a different 
one than he left, largely due to the intense publicity and controversy his arrest had 
occasioned. For the first time, prosecutors and judges (in Chile they are the same person), 
led by Judge Juan Guzmán, began the laborious process of bringing legal actions against 
Pinochet. In August of 2000 the Chilean Supreme Court stripped Pinochet of his 
immunity as Senator-for-Life, but although a variety of suits were brought against him, 
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his legal team, largely claiming his physical unfitness to stand trial, succeeded in keeping 
him out of the courthouse until his ultimate death in December 2006.176  
Pinochet’s arrest in London made international headlines, but caused an huge 
uproar in Chile. Despite eight years of democratic government and continuous talk of 
“reconciliation,” those pursuing legal justice against Pinochet had achieved meager aid 
and few results. Pinochet’s position as Senator for Life, the Amnesty law of 1978, and 
other protections written into the 1980 Constitution made it almost impossible to charge 
him with crimes committed during his time in power. In fact, by 1998, as Brian Loveman 
notes, President Frei decided to “negotiate with the political elite a ley de punto final 
[full-stop law]...to ‘finish’ with the human rights issue” once and for all.177 But 
Pinochet’s arrest would only serve to unveil the historical and memory disputes which 
continued to divide how the Chilean people understood their past and its meaning in the 
present. Pinochet’s arrest also provoked new conversations about how Chile, in a new era 
of democratic government, would situate itself vis-à-vis a Pinochet who, in his time in 
London, had become a metonym for dictator. 178  
Reactions to the General’s detention in London were varied. For many, 
particularly in the center-Left, Pinochet’s arrest was met with the triumphant cheers of 
those who had fought for social justice. It meant that Chile and the world would bear 
witness to the truth that Pinochet and his regime were responsible not just for “excesses,” 
but for crimes against humanity. For another sector of Chile’s populace, however, 
Pinochet’s arrest was seen as both without merit and nothing short of a direct 
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infringement on Chile’s national sovereignty. This group—the so-called pinochetistas—
found Pinochet then (and now) either innocent of all charges or to be praised for acting in 
the best interests of the Chilean state. Harkening back to a Chile of “three thirds,” another 
substantial portion of Chile’s population came down in the middle of the debate. This 
section of society—which included some conservative leaders—recognized the need for 
legal action and agreed that Pinochet needed to stand trial for the charges against him, but 
was also critical of what it saw as an international prepotencia (arrogance) and backed 
the argument that for Pinochet to be arrested in London or tried in Spain undermined 
Chilean sovereignty.179  
 Throughout its coverage of Pinochet’s arrest, El Mercurio invokes Chilean 
identity—using Pinochet to represent Chilean nationhood and sovereignty—to normalize 
Pinochet’s actions and bring him under its whiggish interpretation of Chilean progress. 
Specifically, El Mercurio employed a narrative of collective (national) guilt, which acted 
to absolve Pinochet of any individual responsibility. In order to place historical blame on 
the Chilean nation, the most salient change in El Mercurio’s narrative throughout this 
month is the separation of Pinochet, the man, from the political and social project for 
which, previously, he had been directly credited. El Mercurio summons the whole 
populace to take responsibility for its past and to defend Pinochet for the sake of their 
present and future.  
 El Mercurio attempts to convert Pinochet into the symbol of Chilean identity, 
offsetting a dominant international discourse which increasingly sees him as the 
personification of dictatorship. Demanding Pinochet’s release, then, opens a way for 
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Chile to defend the democracy and the progress the nation has achieved since the 
transition back to democracy while simultaneously eliding the need to bring Pinochet to 
trial. Adopting a similar perspective as it did during the release of the Rettig Report, El 
Mercurio calls for a punto final [final stop] to any misgivings about the past and demands 
a focus, instead, on the future. The paper includes a number of op-eds, editorials and 
news articles from authors with different political leanings to reinforce the point that to 
investigate or alter Chile’s’ history would threaten the nation itself. In a news article from 
October 18, for example, El Mercurio quotes RN representative Alberto Cadenmil:  
The arrest of Senator Pinochet represents the gravest problem the 
country has confronted in terms of reconciliation. This is not a 
question between pinochetistas and antipinochetistas but rather a 
question of State that affects the politics, liberty, and security of all 
Chileans…The Chilean society had closed the transition [process] 
and now the international community wants to open it—which 
represents an enormous threat to the country and all its citizens.180  
 
 
A key issue to arise in Chilean society after Pinochet had left the Moneda was exactly 
what posed the greatest threat to the stability of Chile’s democracy. For El Mercurio and 
most conservative thinkers, the greatest threat came in re-opening the “transitional 
process” for examination. As we have seen, conservative writers tend to see the entire 
Pinochet regime as one of “transition” since his intention was “always” to return the 
country to a “renovated” democracy. For much of Chile’s Left, the greatest threat was 
just the opposite—not examining the past. Here one observes Cadenmil not only assert 
that the transition is a matter of concern only for Chileans, but in the context of 
Pinochet’s “mission accomplished” statement, examination of this process is closed. This 
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reinforces El Mercurio’s argument that the past is something that must be sealed off, put 
away, punto final.181 
Countless other news articles and op-ed pieces intimate that Pinochet’s arrest 
opens up historical fissures that Chile, as a nation, had successfully stitched together 
during the last eight years. Pinochet’s arrest puts “our dignity and national honor up for 
grabs,” whereas, in the view of El Mercurio, what the international community hasn’t 
understood is the progress that Chile has experienced because of Pinochet’s leadership:182 
The political transition that Chile has achieved during these last ten years 
has been considered successful by the national and international 
community. After having gone through traumatic moments of national 
division, of economic crisis and serious social problems, [the country] has 
been able to relocate itself on a path of political and economic accord to 
which the great majority of the nation’s political actors have given their 
consent…. [O]ur country has been able to reach this social consensus 
which has allowed us to move from the military government toward a 
democratic regime [marked by] economic development and social 
progress.183  
 
Much as with other articles, the author of this op-ed emphasizes that the past is over and 
that there is no use in revising or unearthing these “traumatic moments of national 
division.” But the basis for claiming that the past has passed and shouldn’t be reopened is 
the assumed success of the transition, which itself is demonstrated by a supposed 
“agreement” reached by the nation’s political actors. What this, and El Mercurio’s view 
in general, tends to ignore is the large part of the Chilean population left out of this 
consensus, for whom the past remained a painful wound. 
                                                
181 Puttting the livelihood of a restored democracy in question, I must note, feels awfully 
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 While it seeks to close the past, El Mercurio consolidates its vision of Pinochet’s 
legacy and Allende’s failure. In a sharply partisan editorial written by Pablo Rodríguez 
Grez, the former leader of the neo-fascist “Patria y Libertad” terrorist group which 
harassed the Allende government, and the man who later became Pinochet’s lawyer, 
argues: 
What is the road to national reconciliation? In my opinion it begins 
with an honest interpretation and analysis of what happened in 
Chile from 1970 forward, admitting that there is blame to be 
shared… [T]he military regime began a long process of 
reconstruction and, what is more important, of a restructuring of 
our fundamental institutions. This last task was absolutely 
necessary in order to reestablish [refundar] a democracy that will 
not be at the mercy of revolutionary adventurers. The military 
regime committed errors. This is true, particularly in terms of 
excesses committed in the area of human rights. All revolutions – 
and this was a revolution – have a price…[T]he military 
government did its best, and successfully, to restore a liberal 
democracy capable of defending itself, so that it can avoid future 
rabid tyrants. It is this reality, which we so clearly face.184 
 
If his arrest translates to a threat to the nation, then El Mercurio must remind its 
readers of what Pinochet did for Chile. In this rhetorical tour de force, Rodríquez Grez 
makes several points that, more than anything, aid El Mercurio’s inversion of history.  As 
with earlier El Mercurio articles, here the question of who is a “real” revolutionary arises 
again. The paper dismisses the Chilean left as “adventures” and declares that the “real 
revolution” came from Pinochet. Secondly, while accepting that errors were made by 
Pinochet, Rodríquez Grez excuses the military’s human rights violations by claiming that 
all revolutions have their costs and, as the Chilean case proves, the ends justify the 
means. Last but not least, the author asserts that Chile now has a new institutional system 
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that will prevent another “embestida liberticida.”  One must pause here to consider the 
author’s use of this phrase, for it contains the central reversal within a rhetorical scheme 
that El Mercurio has employed since 1990. “Liberticida” is the term for tyrant. Rodríguez 
Grez turns Allende into the “tyrant” (and a bestial one, at that) and Pinochet into Chile’s 
democratic savior. While historians still debate how best to represent these two men, it 
remains beyond argument that it was only Pinochet who acted as dictator in Chile (i.e., 
without an electoral mandate or legislative constraints), and only Pinochet who was 
condemned by national and international human rights agencies for actions perpetrated 
during seventeen years in power. Yet El Mercurio depicts Pinochet’s dictatorship as a 
democratic revolution whose errors, while admitted, must be forgiven.  
The rhetoric of historical inversion emerges in yet another news article from 
October 27:  
They have tried to hide from international public opinion the historic truth 
that under the Chilean military government, the country which had been 
destroyed by a Marxist dictatorship was reconstructed, and that with the 
support and initiative of this military government, a solid, prosperous, and 
stable democracy was installed, along with a free economy that is 
achieving progress and winning the fight against poverty.185 
 
Through this article and others to surface in El Mercurio during this month, the 
newspaper changes its narrative in several ways. Although most of El Mercurio’s articles 
recognize that Pinochet’s leadership sparked divisions in society, they nonetheless argue 
that these divisions have lessened over the last eight years of reconciliation and 
democracy.  
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Consistent with other moments (March 1990 and February 1991), El Mercurio’s 
editorial approach contains a set of veiled threats as it reports on Pinochet’s arrest. As the 
historic roles of Allende and Pinochet get reversed, the claim that Chile’s new democracy 
will “never again” witness the rise of another tyrant is seen to refer back to Allende, and 
not Pinochet. “Nunca más” thus rhetorically confirms Pinochet’s understanding of 
history: never again will Chile allow “Allende” to come to power, not never again will 
the country acquiesce to the disappearances and torture of large numbers of its citizens. 
But given that Allende rose to power by elections, El Mercurio’s discourse questions 
whether Chile’s conservative parties will accept an electoral decision that counters their 
perceived interests. Further, the question El Mercurio raises is the extent to which the 
examination of Chile’s past itself might constitute a return to a forbidden past.  
****** 
IV. The Thirtieth Anniversary of the Coup (September 11, 2003) 
 While the 25th Anniversary of the coup of 1973 (1998) may seem like the most 
logical commemorative marker for looking back at the coup and what followed, , the 30th 
anniversary (2003) became more salient for several reasons. In the first place, the 25th 
anniversary occurred shortly before Pinochet arrest in London. His arrest and the legal 
proceedings it unleashed produced the first serious public investigation into Pinochet’s 
own actions and responsibilities. Additionally, in March 2000, Ricardo Lagos, the first 
Socialist president since Allende, assumed leadership of the country. Unlike his 
predecessor, Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle, who had tried to close off the “Pinochet” and 
human rights stories, Lagos more strongly encouraged Chile’s examination of its past. 
Lagos initiated a “Mesa de Diálogo” [“Dialogue Forum”] in 2000 to confront “the legacy 
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of the military regime’s human rights abuses,” which as he saw it, was essential to 
achieving the “shared dream of national unity and political reconciliation.”186  
For these and other reasons, the 30th anniversary provides an important 
commemorative moment through which to explore transformations in El Mercurio’s 
historical narrative, as it re-opened with newfound fervor the opportunity for Chile to 
confront its recent past. Examination of the 30th anniversary, a historical memory 
bonanza, can demonstrate to what degree El Mercurio’s dominant narrative had 
accommodated to the rapidly accumulating documentation and the growing counter-
memory narratives that had emerged more forcefully since 1998.187 
For memory work, anniversaries are inherently prolific: As one editorial from El 
Mercurio explains, “Anniversaries are moments when one can exorcise the ghosts of the 
past which continue to pursue us, preventing us from constructing the future in peace.”188 
The 30th anniversary of September 11, 1973 is certainly no exception as the reader is led 
to wonder exactly what “ghosts” El Mercurio thinks require exorcising. Not surprisingly, 
the paper’s coverage portrays the day of the coup, its meaning and how it should be 
observed, as a day that continues to divide Chileans: “Thirty years after September 11, 
1973, the wounds persist and are still open.”189 In the face of this undeniably meaningful 
anniversary, El Mercurio digresses from its argument that the past can be closed off. 
                                                
186 Loveman, Chile: The Legacy of Hispanic Capitalism, 355-6.  
187 This period was also marked by President Clinton’s released of a huge number of US 
government documents devoted to U.S.-Chilean relations during the period leading up to 
the coup and during the Pinochet government. These documents that are summarized and 
analyzed in Peter Kornbluh, The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and 
Accountability (New York: New Press, 2003). 
188 El Mercurio, September 9, 2003, Eugenio Tironi “Allende en la Memoria,” A3.  
189 El Mercurio, September 14, 2003, “11 De Septiembre, fecha que sigue dividiendo a 
Chile,” news analysis from “Reportajes” D23.  
 112 
Instead, it recognizes that the wounds left by Chile’s recent past are still painful, 
particularly given the on-going revelations about the human rights violations committed 
under Pinochet’s regime, and moves to engage the past rather than promote a punto final.  
Three historical representations (re)surface in El Mercurio’s coverage during 
September 2003. In the first place, the paper reprises its own reporting of the coup as it 
(alone of all the newspapers) was able to record it. As it unearthed its original coverage 
of the period, El Mercurio reformatted one section of its “National” pages everyday 
(from September 1-11, 2003) to insert images of the coup (See Appendix, Article 4).  
The second representation is of the anniversary of September 11, 1973, the 
commemoration of the event, rather than the event itself. This self-reflective posture 
offers insights into whether and how El Mercurio’s interpretation of the coup has 
changed over the intervening three decades.  
A third representation to play out in El Mercurio’s pages during this month 
concerns the way the Chilean nation will (or should) remember September 11, 1973 in 
the present, i.e., on September 11, 2003.   
 El Mercurio’s narrative of the 30th anniversary reinforces the paper’s dominant 
interpretation of September 11, 1973 as the ultimate crisis of Chile’s political institutions. 
Although El Mercurio reasserts that the crisis emerged primarily because of Allende and 
the Unidad Popular, as its narrative evolved over the previous thirteen years, the paper 
found itself more willing to acknowledge that on September 11, 1973, the military did 
overthrow a civilian elected president and that throughout Pinochet’s rule human rights 
abuses did occur. But the paper still proposed that the ultimate meaning of the coup lay  
in the fact that it opened the door to a stronger democracy in Chile and, therefore, can be 
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understood as a period that fits comfortably within Chile’s older history of continual 
progress.  
During this month, El Mercurio establishes a new approach to the question of 
history and the effort to understand what happened in Chile’s past. While it temporarily 
abandons its well-worn approach that the past should not be examined, El Mercurio 
instead intimates that what matters when one reviews the past is one’s interpretive 
understanding. This particular perspective surfaces in many of El Mercurio’s news 
articles, editorials and op-eds. In the first place, El Mercurio will accuse the Left for what 
it finds to be its subjective examination of September 11, 1973 and, therefore, for its 
falsification of history. Secondly, the paper insists that, unlike the Left, the Right can see 
the past as it actually occurred. Thus, El Mercurio will reinforce that it was Allende who 
converted a democracy into a tyranny and Pinochet who, while he made errors along the 
way, ultimately brought progress and stability to Chile. Finally many of El Mercurio’s 
articles assume a more troubling tone, hinting that there are consequences, a price to be 
paid, for misinterpreting the past. If the past is to be examined then Chile’s leaders and 
the public better draw the “right” conclusions from that examination. 
The Left and the Writing of History: 
As previously stated, a frequent assertion in El Mercurio is that since the coup, 
the Left only understood the past from its own perspective whereas the Right was able to 
view it more objectively and more holistically. While this narrative thread emerged 
before 2003, El Mercurio returns to it vigorously in early September 2003.  A news 
article quotes RN representative Sergio Romero saying, “If some want to falsify history, 
stubborn facts, as those socialist comrades would say, are stronger and demonstrate that 
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here, the only ones responsible for the political violence which occurred are those who 
wanted to change our democracy into a tyranny.”190 Romero accuses the Left of 
falsifying history and reiterates that it was Allende who wanted to turn democratic Chile 
into a totalitarian state. Pinochet’s former interior minister, Sergio Onofre Jarpa, echoes 
this position and takes it further, calling for the Concertación to recognize that “it was an 
error to try to impose a Marxist system which was rejected by the majority.” El Mercurio 
quotes Jarpa’s argument at length:  
The debate in the Concertación around the events of [September] 11 helps 
us know who were the ones truly responsible for the chaos of that 
period…[W]e have seen the positions taken by those in positions of 
responsibility who had the possibility of taking Chile along a 
constitutional, democratic road and who preferred to encourage 
confrontations, illegal seizures of property, and the organization of illegal 
armed groups.191 
 
A close reading of Jarpa’s argument is quite productive.  For Jarpa, the very fact 
that the center-left Concertación government was still debating the meaning of September 
11 proves (reveals) (“ha servido para saber”), by that act alone, that it (the Left) was 
responsible for producing the “chaos” which led to the coup of September 11, 1973.  
An editorial written by Pablo Rodríguez Grez, the former leader of the terrorist 
organization, Patria y Libertad, further explores the project of history, observing that 
“History cannot be written by hiding matters of such magnitude,” which seems fair 
enough. Yet for Rodríquez Grez what was overlooked by the Concertación’s leaders, and 
by implication, the Left, was “the totalitarian project of the Popular Unity “192 Consistent 
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with the arguments of many of El Mercurio’s roster of editorialists, Rodríguez Grez 
suggests that those who seek to honor Allende are unable to see that their fallen hero’s 
real desire was to promote a “totalitarian project,” and are thus liable for the falsification 
of history. In a relatively subtle step, yet one which El Mercurio is willing to take, the 
paper suggests that those who read history incorrectly—who do not interpret the past as 
its writers do—constitute a threat to Chile’s present.  
In an editorial entitled “Los Dos Rostros del 11 de Septiembre” [“The Two Faces 
of September 11”], Joaquin Fermandois suggests that there is a critical need to examine 
both sides of September 11, 1973, again, a reasonable approach to the past. Yet he 
stresses that a failure to appreciate the “positive” side of September 11, 1973 can lead to 
a reliving of Chile’s “extremist” past:  
…[T]he present attempt [by those in the government] to totally 
delegitimize [the coup of] September 11 and the military government 
speaks to the future of the country… The intent of such a unilateralist 
view of the past, as has been generated over these past few months, could 
cause us to slip off the path of (re)building onto one of extremism and 
thereby to repeat another 1973.193 
  
Fermandois’ contention that any historical account that fails to acknowledge what he 
calls the “positive side” of the coup and the military government, thereby threatens the 
stability of the country. As he repeats and extends the arguments of the much more 
radical Rodríguez Grez. Fermandois embeds two important understandings in this 
statement. In the first place, he asserts that any “thorough” historical examination of the 
military’s actions on September 11, 1973 and thereafter must be “balanced,” and to be 
balanced the “positive” must be presented alongside the “negative.” While those who 
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write history cannot afford to close off perspectives that challenge their conclusions, this 
outlook fails to recognize that the production of history is never a balancing act: if you 
say something bad, you have to say something good.  
More unnerving is the argument that a failure to read Chile’s history “correctly” 
can lead to “another 1973.” This raises the central historical question of the meaning of 
“1973” and its discursive instability, just as the meaning of “nunca más” has never been 
stabilized. What is another 1973? Assuming that Fermandois does not view it as a fertile 
period of leftist organizing and popular power but rather as a period of chaos, another 
“1973” would require military intervention once again. The logic of the statement, then, 
suggests that because the Left examines the past in a manner not considered to be 
“balanced,” it implicitly opens the doors to another military intervention.  
And yet, while Fermandois’ editorial seems to reflect a continuing conservative 
narrative about the dangers of interpreting the past incorrectly, it also opens a new line of 
commentary that only appeared among conservative writers after years of revelations of 
Pinochet’s abuses. “The country re-encountered its direction and established its political 
and economic strategy only at a high cost and not without errors and abuses which, 
besides those in the human rights sphere, included dangerous temptations such as that of 
identifying the State with a person.”194 This marks a process by which El Mercurio and 
the Right will distance itself from Pinochet without either challenging the 
accomplishments of the Junta (the country had, after all, “re-encounter[ed] its direction”) 
or supporting any legal moves against him. Yes, it was dangerous to one’s leader think 
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that he was the State, but that is part of history, and what’s done is done. History cannot 
be revised or reversed.  
Broader Perspectives and the Resurrection of Salvador Allende:  
By the 30th anniversary of the coup, El Mercurio had opened up its columns to a 
wider group of commentarists, and one notes opinion from more moderate voices. This 
becomes evident as El Mercurio includes articles that reintroduce Allende as a historic 
figure and honor him for his commitment to democratic ideals. Of course, Allende will be 
more on people’s minds as the nation looks back at the 30 years since his death, but his 
presence is also noted because of burgeoning efforts on behalf of the Concertación (in 
particular President Lagos) and other members of Chile’s Left to commemorate 
Allende’s memory in public ceremonies, bringing him within a national spotlight, not just 
as part of leftist remembrance.195 And yet if conservative commentators begin to separate 
the military’s project from Pinochet the man, so one can see in the pages of El Mercurio a 
move to encourage the separation of Allende from his project.  
To be true to the facts, Chilean democracy should give senator 
Allende the honor of recognizing his democratic outlook…[O]ne 
has to recognize senator Allende for the way in which he fulfilled 
the [democratic] norms and practices of the Senate. And although 
no one can exonerate him of the enormous responsibility which he 
carries for the errors of his government, [which were] the 
fundamental and determining cause for the destruction of 
democracy, 30 years after his death his memory deserves to be 
honored and respected.196 
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The author of this piece, Jorge Schaulsohn, was a member of the Concertación and was 
therefore not the typical El Mercurio spokesman. Yet Schaulsohn (El Mercurio, which 
printed his article) pay Allende a decidedly backhanded compliment. On the one hand, 
the destruction of Chile’s democracy is laid directly at his doorstep. On the other hand, if 
Allende is to reappear in the public imagination, as controlled by El Mercurio, his reentry 
will be limited: he is memorialized not as “President” Allende, but as a senator. It is 
Pinochet who is remembered as Chile’s “President.” El Mercurio’s inclusion of a more 
moderate voice thus actually helps reinforce its own memory narrative in which the roles 
of Allende and Pinochet are stood on their heads.   
In the days leading up to the 30th anniversary of the coup and in the weeks that 
followed, El Mercurio engaged with Chile’s recent past in new ways. While it ultimately 
adhered to its master narrative that Allende’s government destroyed Chilean democracy, 
the paper abandoned its posture that Chile’s past must remain in the past. The presence of 
the past, was almost palpable in Chile in 2003 and that “ghost” could not be put back into 
the closet. While over the previous thirteen years El Mercurio approached the writing of 
history from a point of negation—leave it in the closed box—around the 30th Anniversary 
it realized that it could not ignore the wounds that continued to fester in the present. Yet 
while its narrative shifted to reflect the continuity of history in the present, El Mercurio 
used the anniversary year to reinforce its argument that it was the Left which continues to 
disfigure history (by not acknowledging the UP’s role in destroying democracy in Chile), 
thereby putting the Chilean nation at risk of repeating that past. But as before, El 
Mercurio remains coy about who might cause Chile to relive its dark past.  
****** 
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V. The National Commission on Political Imprisonment and Torture (November 
2003) 
 
 In August 2003, President Lagos issued an order to investigate those human rights 
violations committed during Pinochet’s rule, which, unlike those examined in the Rettig 
Report, did not result in death. The “Comisión Nacional Sobre Prisión Política y Tortura” 
(National Commission on Political Imprisonment and Torture) or the Valech 
Commission, as it became known after its chairman, the Auxiliary Bishop of Santiago, 
Sergio Valech, was comprised of eight members and sought to locate victims of the 
military, hear their testimony, and deliberate as to whether they should receive any 
reparation.197 In November 2004, the Commission released a final report with the names 
and testimony of the 35,000 Chileans it documented to have been tortured or abused for 
political reasons between September 11, 1973 and March 10, 1990. The investigation and 
its supporting documentation, which stretched to more than 1,000 pages, are heart-
wrenching and startling in their sheer magnitude.198 
The release of the Valech Report represented a crucial step forwards in Chile’s 
reconciliation process. Despite fourteen years of center-Left leadership, the victims of 
political imprisonment and torture had not gained official or public recognition for the 
injustices committed against them during Pinochet’s dictatorship. For over fourteen 
years, victims of torture had lived side by side with their torturers and had yet to see 
Chile’s government assume responsibility for the abuses carried by the state. The Valech 
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Report was a sign of progress, and it was followed, in November 2004, by a public 
acknowledgement by the head of the Armed Forces, Juan Emilio Cheyre, that the military 
and other public officials were responsible for human rights violations. In a national 
address following Cheyre’s, President Lagos echoed the Army chief, marking the first 
“official” admission of the Chilean government’s responsibility for 40,000 cases of 
human rights abuses.199 
 The Valech Report without doubt presented El Mercurio with a central challenge 
since it has long insisted that human rights abuses under the military were not as 
widespread as the report demonstrated. As the research shows, this moment demonstrates 
how El Mercurio’s narrative evolved to incorporate a growing “counter memory,” in 
particular the theme of human rights, into its own pages. Yet the Valech Report—and the 
particular way El Mercurio represents it—is perhaps more significant inasmuch as it 
shows the degree to which El Mercurio’s integration of counter or dissident memory had 
become so standard that the reader barely notices, and may even expect it. Over the years 
El Mercurio’s narrative has so “naturally” incorporated a version of the past that admits 
to humans right abuses that its readers may forget that the narrative of human rights 
violations was ever considered a counter memory. This is significant because it allows El 
Mercurio and the Right to absorb counter memory narratives and normalize them into its 
whiggish interpretation of Chile’s recent, authoritarian past.   
Still, El Mercurio’s coverage of the Valech Report is critical because it signals the 
end of the first phase of the construction of the paper’s post-Pinochet memory narrative. 
In November 2004, one detects El Mercurio shifting its discursive efforts towards 
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shaping a present and future that will protect its central post-dictatorship narrative. Thus 
around the release of the Valech Report, El Mercurio uses ts historic positioning to define 
chilenidad (Chilean national identity) as a means to safeguard against the destabilization 
of its narrative.  
El Mercurio’s coverage of the Valech report, then, reflects the paper’s work to 
“rethink the nation” and prove that Chile is stronger, more united and more democratic 
because of Pinochet’s government, a move which allows Chileans to look past the abuses 
committed. At this historical juncture, El Mercurio begins to use its narrative as a means 
to create the imagined community of the future, not just to interpret the past.200 
  El Mercurio employs a notion of Chilean nationalism to counter the negative past 
unveiled by the Valech commission in November 2004. Specifically, the paper uses the 
release of Valech both to demonstrate that Chile is united by its past and to inscribe a 
new definition of chilenidad. While El Mercurio deploys this approach through a variety 
of its articles, one of the most interesting examples comes from an editorial entitled “El 
Cuerpo de Chile” [“Chile’s Body”], written by Eugenio Tironi.201 Tironi begins by 
suggesting that, “It was time already to look straight on at this tragedy, our tragedy.”202 
Tironi refers to the revelations contained in the Valech Report of the massive human 
rights abuses as “our tragedy.” But, he argues, Chile is finally strong enough to confront 
the brutal reality of the Valech Report, and that it must do so requires the remembering of 
what happened in the country: “only nations that have memory, and that can reveal their 
                                                
200 Benedict R. O'G Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and 
Spread of Nationalism, Rev. ed. (London: Verso, 2006), 35.  
201 Eugenio Tironi is a Chilean public intellectual. He is a professor of Sociology at 
Pontíficia Universidad Cátolica in Santiago. 
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entire past, without hiding even the most atrocious parts, can build a common dream 
which they can share with others.”203 Through Tironi, El Mercurio argues that the Valech 
Report has allowed the Chilean nation to overcome its shared past— “our tragedy”—in 
order to realize a shared future with the common dream of national unity. While this isn’t 
an unusual move for the paper, it does mark one of the first moments El Mercurio 
invokes the role of memory in the project of creating national unity.  
Chile, for Tironi, can now afford to remember because “today’s Chile is different. 
We can now take on board…all the pain that led us to attack one another. We have to do 
this in order to jointly look at the past without the weight of fear, shame or guilt, and 
launch ourselves as a single community toward the future.”204 As generous as Tironi’s 
commentary appears, it is highly problematic in a moment when the crimes of the past 
largely have not been adjudicated. If the past becomes “our tragedy,” and “our collective 
responsibility,” than individual responsibility disappears. If Chile can accept that “the 
entire Chilean society failed,” then the past can be referenced without actual or literal 
consequences in the present.205 Resorting to notions of collective guilt, as it did during 
Pinochet’s arrest, has allowed El Mercurio to absolve individual actors (in particular 
Pinochet) for the crimes of the past and also ensure that the past remains, safely, at a 
distance. If we give Tironi the benefit of the doubt, his claim of a collective responsibility 
at the moment of the release of the Valech Report encourages Chileans to evaluate both 
their relationship and their government’s relationship to events of the past. But what is 
                                                
203 El Mercurio, November 16, 2004, Eugenio Tironi, “El Cuerpo de Chile,” editorial A 
3.  
204 Ibid.  
205 El Mercurio, November 18, 2004, Eugenio Droguett, “Torturas: Lavín y el informe: 
“toda la sociedad chilena falló,” news analysis, C7.  
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troubling about Tironi’s ‘collective responsibility’ is that he suggests that those who lack 
responsibility for the torture of 40,000 people must assume as much of a burden of guilt 
as those whose deeds had only just been reported.  
Collective memory, the need to revisit the past and remember the facts of history, 
emerges in El Mercurio’s discourse as a way for the paper to construct a sense of shared 
guilt for the past as a “tragedy” rather than a crime. Yet it also emerges as a means of 
fostering Chilean community and nationhood. To such an end, El Mercurio turns the 
Valech Report into a point of national pride. Agustín Squella’s editorial entitled, “Sobre 
la Tortura,” [“About Torture”] illustrates this:  “I don’t know of another country which 
has had similar experiences in the area of human rights which can show such results as 
these… It is essential to establish a collective memory which is not only about repression, 
but the solidarity expressed in hopes and dreams.”206 Like Tironi’s opinion mentioned 
above, Squella locates Chile’s strength in its ability to collectively confront its past, even 
though he seems to have overlooked other post-authoritarian regimes such as South 
Africa where, many have argued, the process of reconciliation has gone much further 
than the Chilean. Squella, however, hopes that Chileans see in the Valech Report a past 
that is not only about repression but about future solidarity. What he doesn’t suggest is 
whether those who suffered from the abuses should reside in the same collective memory 
as those who abused them.  
One of the main ways that El Mercurio frames Valech is to instill, to employ 
Benedict Anderson’s terms, a sense of “imagined community” between the victims and 
                                                
206 El Mercurio, December 3, 2004, Agustín Squella, “Sobre la Tortura,” opinion A3. 
Agustín Squella is a regular columnist of El Mercurio and was also a cultural attaché 
under President Lagos.  
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the nation.207 To achieve this, El Mercurio emblematizes the victims (their faces and 
testimonies) as the new Chilean nation, the new chilenidad. In a special report, El 
Mercurio profiled several of the torture victims as they openly recounted their 
experiences in detention centers (see Appendix, Article 5). Deceptively simple, this 
article speaks volumes about El Mercurio’s project vis-à-vis the Valech Report. As the 
faces of Chile’s tortured become the new face of the nation, El Mercurio capitalizes on its 
traditional power to “think the nation” and enables “rapidly growing numbers of people 
to think about themselves, and to relate themselves to others, in profoundly new ways.”208 
That El Mercurio will put a literal face on the “ordinary” Chileans who were tortured 
during the military government suggests that the paper, and the country, have modified 
their views since 1990. And yet, framing a dark past by asserting a supposed unity of 
purpose in the present is disingenuous and still allows El Mercurio to argue that history, 
i.e., the process of investigation, documentation, and analysis of the past, is over. El 
Mercurio thus distinguishes between acknowledging the past, on the one hand, and “re-
opening” it, on the other.  
El Mercurio reasserts the same need to not re-open the ideological divisions of the 
past in an editorial entitled “To Heal the Wounds, Not Reopen Them.” The author writes, 
that “we should now avoid the danger that the Valech Report will be used to carry on 
[preexisting] divisions [so that some can] obtain modest political advantages.”209 El 
Mercurio implies that “a society which wants to be healthy and democratic” must 
confront its past, but then lay it to rest in the catacombs of history. 
                                                
207 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, 5-6.  
208 Ibid., 36.  
209 El Mercurio, November 30, 2004, “Sanar las heridas, no reabrirlas,” editorial A3.  
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In conclusion, El Mercurio’s coverage of Valech marks the closure of a long 
phase of its historical reconstruction. It has normalized an interpretation of the past that 
reflects a seemingly “upside down” approach to history, in which Pinochet operates as 
the democratic paradigm and Allende the totalitarian tyrant. After Pinochet’s arrest in 
1998 and five years of incriminating revelations about his dictatorship, El Mercurio had 
been forced to expand its narrative to represent at least the existence, and sometimes the 
voice, of Chile’s torture victims. Yet while El Mercurio broadened its narrative in the 
face of an unfolding reality, including evidence of personal corruption as revealed in the 
Rigg’s Bank, it has done so in such a way that reinforces its whiggish interpretation that 
Chile’s history has been one of unending democratic progress.210  
Indeed, prevailing themes reappear even as new evidence is inserted. The Valech 
Report, an investigation into the experiences of individuals who “threatened” the nation, 
now converts them into the faces of post-dictatorial chilenidad. El Mercurio revises the 
place of torture victims in the collective imagination and in so doing, not only searches 
for a way to finally close off history, but also manages to navigate a very deliberate set of 
criminal actions onto the terrain of national tragedy. As Simone Weil so importantly 
observed, tragedy should not be confused with crime; in crimes, the choice is between a 
morally good act and a morally reprehensible one, there are criminals and victims.  
Tragedies are the product of having to choose between two morally equivalent acts set 
                                                
210 Many individuals will argue that the Right’s “split” from Pinochet occurred most 
defiantly after the Riggs Bank disclosures in July 2004. In the summer of 2004, the 
Washington Post reported that, beginning in 1985, Pinochet deposited secret checks 
worth millions of dollars in secret accounts he and his family kept at Washington’s Riggs 
Bank and elsewhere. The cascading investigation of Pinochet’s ‘platas’ became a 
spectacle in Chile and put Pinochet’s reputation and integrity on the line creating the first 
serious rift among some of his staunchest backers. 
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against each other. As the Valech Report, the Rettig Reports, and so many others have 
revealed, what happened in Chile was a crime, not a tragedy.  
 
Conclusion: El Mercurio and Social Memory After the Fact 
 
During an interview I conducted in August 2008, I asked Matías Tagle 
Domínguez, a senior history professor at Santiago’s Catholic University, how he thought 
the Chilean people would remember the past 35 years of its nation’s history 50 or 100 
years from now. Expecting (quite naively) that Tagle Domínguez would confirm my 
supposition that the period between the coup of 1973 and the end of Pinochet’s seventeen 
year dictatorship would be remembered as a heart-rending chapter of human suffering, he 
responded: “as a period of deepening democracy.”  Tagle Domínquez himself did not see 
Pinochet’s rule as a period in which democracy was strengthened … but he thought 
Chilean society would.   After examining El Mercurio’s narrative reconstruction of 
Chile’s recent history, Professor Tagle Domínquez’ answer sounds remarkably 
clairvoyant.  
Indeed it is as a period of democratic strengthening and progress that Chile’s 
newspaper of record has re-inscribed Pinochet’s brutal rule from its post-dictatorship 
vantage point. After analyzing the way Chilean history is popularly represented in the 
pages of Chile’s leading newspaper, who can fault Professor Tagle Domínquez’ outlook 
on the way in which future generations of Chileans will remember their past?  El 
Mercurio’s narrative, as we have seen, has turned a democratically elected government 
into a Marxist “dictatorship,” and brutal dictatorship into a “revolution of liberty and 
freedom.”  
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 As this thesis has shown, El Mercurio, the foremost voice of the Right, the media 
outlet which has given itself the power to determine what is Chilean, has in many 
disturbing ways succeeded in converting what has been confirmed by broad historical 
consensus as a period of democratic rupture—a period of immense loss and civil 
discord—into its own whiggish narrative of democratic progress. El Mercurio has not 
only used history to absolve Pinochet and his military regime of the 40,000 cases of 
torture and “disappearance” (some 3,000 of which resulted in death), but has used 
memory to forewarn Chilean society and its center-Left government that if the past is not 
“closed” —if the meanings it has created about the Pinochet dictatorship are not accepted 
as inviolate by those in the present — Chile will run the risk of reaping the same 
gruesome harvest in the future as it has in the past.  
To be sure, El Mercurio’s national history narrative evolved and expanded during 
the fourteen years covered in this study. From an analysis of the period beginning in 
March 1990 with Chile’s transition back to civilian government and ending in November 
2004 with the release of the Valech Report, one observes how the paper’s historical 
account has broadened to include the memory narratives of those it did not initially 
include—nor even acknowledge—before Pinochet left La Moneda. Of course the most 
salient and concrete changes in El Mercurio’s discursive reconstruction are its 
recognition and eventual incorporation of human rights violations into its own account. 
Since it never previously admitted that such abuses were committed—certainly not at the 
moment in which they occurred—El Mercurio’s integration of this “counter-memory” is 
significant and speaks to the narrative evolution that has undeniably taken place in the 
post-dictatorship period. In fact, one can argue that the disclosure and publication of 
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numerous “official” reports on human rights violations committed during Pinochet’s rule, 
beginning with those of the Rettig Commission, served as the basis of El Mercurio’s 
emerging historical revisionism.  
Yet, while El Mercurio accommodates and includes the narratives that reveal 
Pinochet’s brutality, it does so in a way that nevertheless maintains both the paper’s 
posture as a staunch defender of democratic ideals and Chile’s master narrator of 
democratic continuity. As detailed in my analysis of each specific event covered, El 
Mercurio deployed a variety of discursive approaches—variously mobilizing issues of 
political institutionalism, economic growth and social integration, chilenidad (Chilean 
nationalism), human rights abuses, symbolic exchanges between Allende and Pinochet, 
and history and historiographic investigation—to support its positivist reading of 
Pinochet’s regime. But, in the end, it is El Mercurio’s linking of Chile’s present—the 
period after Pinochet—to the dictatorial regime that ultimately influences how future 
generations will come to view Chile’s national past and its meaning to their present. If 
those who study Pinochet’s brutal rule in 50 or 100 years remember (as El Mercurio 
suggests) that the roots of Chile’s democratic fulfillment were planted as early as 
September 12, 1973, then Pinochet is credited for a political project which, his own 
writings reveal, he disdained at best and despised at worst.211  
Who knows what will eventually join Allende’s shattered eyeglasses in the Museo 
Histórico Nacional to bring the narrative of Chile’s history into the 21st century.  The sole 
issue that remains beyond dispute by those who study contemporary Chilean history is 
                                                
211 An examination of General Pinochet’s speeches and public statements between the 
coup and 1976, in particular, will reveal his political and temperamental dislike of 
democracy, particularly when it could produce results with which he disagreed. 
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the highly contentious nature of that examination. And, to the extent that the project of 
history is built on competing interpretations of historical data, then we should not feel 
disheartened. But if this examination of El Mercurio’s historical narrative has succeeded, 
my hope is that it will have raised for its readers the risks of writing a history that not 
only inverts the facts, but simultaneously insists on its interpretation and warns against 
future revisionism.  
In conclusion, this study has probed the complex dynamics governing the relation 
of historical “truth” to social memory. It has intended to continually raise the question of 
how lay citizens, not professional historians, are to understand and remember their past 
when deliberately inaccurate historical narratives vie to become the “official” record of 
what happened.  
El Mercurio produced a narrative after the fact. Its veracity needs to be 
questioned by citizens who not only lived during the Pinochet era but also by those who 
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